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Recalibrating the Scales of Municipal Court Justice in 
Missouri: A Dissenter’s View  
Kimberly Jade Norwood
 
The municipal court in this state is today too much an 
anomaly, too backward in its procedures, too arbitrary in its 
administration, to gain for it the respect by the public which a 
court must have. The attitudes of many of our citizens toward 
the courts and the law are shaped by unhappy experience in 
these courts. But more important still, we cannot tolerate a 
court system which is anything less than the finest which man 
can devise. For it is through these courts that the ideal of 
justice under the law must be sought.
1 
The above quote is taken from an eerily applicable law review article 
published in 1966—fifty years ago. The municipal courts in Missouri 
have gotten worse. Recalibration of the scales of municipal court 
justice in Missouri is long overdue.  
 
  Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law in St. 
Louis, Missouri. I wish to give a special thank you to five people who were instrumental in 
helping me with this Article. The first, of course, is my husband, Ronald Alan Norwood, who 
continues to be a blessing to me and my work every day. I next thank retired Missouri Supreme 
Court Judge and former Saint Louis University law school Dean Michael Wolff. Judge Wolff 
was crucial in helping me talk through my conclusions about municipal court reforms. I also 
thank the Ferguson Commission for its dedication to the work demanded of them and for the 
exhaustive report they compiled which was terribly valuable to me in my work. I also thank 
David Leipholtz, Director of Community Based Studies at Better Together, a grass-roots project 
in St. Louis whose mission is “to develop and assemble valuable information other 
organizations can use to develop their own plans for what the future of the region should look 
like.” Better Together Releases Municipal Courts Study, BETTER TOGETHER (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/better-together-releases-municipal-courts-study. Dave was 
invaluable in providing me with the data I needed for virtually all of the exhibits that are a part 
of this Article. My two research assistants were also crucial to the successful completion of this 
work: thank you to Brian Hall (J.D. 2016) and to Tadeus Martyn (J.D. Candidate 2017).  
 1. T. E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 MO. L. REV. 
69, 97 (1966). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 51:121 
 
 
In May of 2015, I was appointed by Missouri Supreme Court 
Chief Judge Mary R. Russell to join what became a nine member 
Missouri Supreme Court Municipal Division Work Group.
2
 The 
group came to be as a result of the events surrounding the killing of 
Michael Brown by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson on August 
9, 2014. The protests, visual militarization of the police, tear gassing, 
arrests, and looting caused a ripple effect around the country. In 
calling for justice in the killing of unarmed black males Ferguson 
became a household word, not only throughout the United States, but 
around the world.
3
  
At the time of Michael Brown’s death, ArchCity Defenders, a 
small St Louis law nonprofit organization that represents the indigent 
and working poor in the St. Louis region, published the results of 
years-long research on the operation of municipal courts in their 
“Municipal Courts White Paper” (the ArchCity White Paper).4 This 
paper addressed the aggressive, unjust, and even unconstitutional 
policing practices of various municipalities to generate revenue to 
keep municipalities in business.
5
 Afterwards, the ArchCity White 
Paper became a national story—not only as a result of Brown’s death, 
which occurred shortly before publication, but because the ArchCity 
White Paper was picked up and expanded in the Washington Post, 
which detailed the municipal court system’s alleged abuses of black 
and poor residents.
6
 These stories increased the attention on Michael 
Brown’s death, the protests, and what was happening in Ferguson.  
 
 2. See Missouri Supreme Court Order, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
 3. KIMBERLY NORWOOD, FERGUSON FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A 
NATION 1 (2016). In telling the story of the killing of Michael Brown, the book details many of 
the surrounding and related events that fueled anger, hurt, exhaustion and protests. This 
includes not only the failure of the Grand Jury to indict the officer who killed Michael Brown, 
but also many other issues that plagued this community over the years including segregated 
housing, challenged school districts, public health inadequacies, police and municipalities 
preying on the poor population to generate fees to continued its municipal government 
operations and the like.  
 4. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, infra note 73. 
 5. See Mission Statement, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, http://www.archcitydefenders.org/ 
who-we-are/our-mission-story/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); see also ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, 
infra note 73. 
 6. Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/ 
how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty/?tid=a_inl; See also Radley Balko, New 
Report Details the Disastrous Municipal Court System in St. Louis County, WASH. POST (Oct. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/12
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Under increasing pressure to appoint a commission to study the 
issues underlying the policing of residents in Ferguson, the Governor 
of Missouri announced that he would indeed create one.
7
 The sixteen-
member Ferguson Commission (the Commission) was sworn in on 
November 18, 2014. It was charged with holding public hearings 
(approximately twenty such hearings were held) and gathering data 
for “a report with policy recommendations in the following areas: 
citizen-law enforcement interaction and relations; racial and ethnic 
relations; municipal government organization and the municipal court 
system; and disparities in areas including education, economic 
opportunity, housing, transportation, health care, child care, business 
ownership, and family and community stability.”8 Specifically, it was 
called to focus on “the underlying root causes that led to the unrest in 
the wake of Michael Brown’s death and to publish an unflinching 
report with transformative policy recommendations for making the 
region stronger and a better place for everyone to live and to guide 
the community in charting a new path toward healing and positive 
change for the residents of the St. Louis region.”9 The report, 
Forward Through Ferguson: A Path Toward Racial Equity, was 
issued in September of 2015, less than a year after the Commission 
was created—an astounding feat by any account—and it was the 
most detailed report by any commission of its kind.
10
 The written 
report, over 204 pages long with over 200 different calls for action, 
 
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/28/new-report-details-
the-disastrous-municipal-court-system-in-st-louis-county/ (following up a month later on the 
prior article). 
 7. Ben Kesling, Missouri Governor Announces Creation of ‘Ferguson Commission’ 
Body to Examine Underlying, Systemic Inequality in Wake of Michael Brown Shooting, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/missouri-governor-announces-creation-of-
ferguson-commission-1413914495.  
 8. See Gov. Nixon Announces Members of the Ferguson Commission, OFF. MO. 
GOVERNOR JAY NIXON (Nov. 18, 2014), https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-
announces-members-ferguson-commission. 
 9. See Building the Report, STL POSITIVE CHANGE, http://stlpositivechange.org/ 
commission-work (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  
 10. See THE FERGUSON COMMISSION, STL POSITIVE CHANGE, FORWARD THROUGH 
FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY (2015), available at http://3680or2khmk3bzkp 
33juiea1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommission 
Report.pdf [hereinafter FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT] (summarizing a larger pool of data, 
research and conclusions available on the Commission’s website); see also STL POSITIVE 
CHANGE, http://stlpositivechange.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  
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was a comprehensive summary of the Commission’s work; so 
comprehensive in fact that a website was created to house the 
information underlying the report.
11
  
While the Commission was in the throes of its work, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) was busy with two of its own 
investigations as a result of the Brown killing. One investigation 
focused on Darren Wilson, the Ferguson police officer who shot and 
killed Michael Brown. The second report focused on the Ferguson 
Police Department. While the DOJ found no reason to pursue civil 
rights violations charges against Officer Wilson,
12
 it issued a 
blistering report regarding the Ferguson Police Department.
13
 That 
report included details of the overzealous and even unconstitutional 
policing of black and poor residents in Ferguson, aggressive ticketing 
for municipal code violations, and racism and bias by both law 
enforcement and court personnel evidenced by hundreds of emails 
and other data collected by the DOJ.
14
 These two reports were issued 
in March of 2015, shortly before the Missouri Supreme Court 
Municipal Division Work Group was created.
15
 The DOJ report on 
the Ferguson Police Department was so damning that the DOJ 
threatened to sue Ferguson unless changes were instituted.
16
 The 
Ferguson City Council initially rejected the DOJ’s negotiated consent 
decree and the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the city the very day of the 
 
 11. See FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10. 
 12. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI 
POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown. 
pdf. 
 13. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/ 
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT]. 
 14. Id.  
 15. See supra notes 9, 12. 
 16. Eyder Peralta, Ferguson, Justice Unveil Draft Of Negotiated Consent Decree, NPR 
(Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/27/464610005/ferguson-
justice-unveil-draft-of-negotiated-consent-decree. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/12
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rejection.
17
 Ferguson wisely capitulated and ultimately accepted the 
terms of the consent decree.
18
  
Various nonprofit organizations, the media, the Governor of 
Missouri, the DOJ, other court-related organizations,
19
 and even the 
Missouri Legislature weighed in, just a few months after the Brown 
killing, on municipal court reforms.
20
 This created pressure on the 
 
 17. Carimah Townes, Ferguson Refuses to Make Police Reforms Proposed by the DOJ, 
THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 10, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2016/02/10/3748090/ 
ferguson-rejects-doj-decree/; Jason Rosenbaum, DOJ Sues Ferguson After Mo. City Rejects 
Police Overhaul Deal, NPR (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/11/466376943/doj-
sues-ferguson-after-city-rejects-police-overhaul-deal. 
 18. See Willis Ryder Arnold, Ferguson City Council Accepts Department of Justice Consent 
Decree, NPR (Mar. 16, 2016), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/ferguson-city-council-accepts-
department-justice-consent-decree (illustrating that Ferguson finally came to its senses). The 
consent decree was executed on March 17, 016. The Decree requires a Monitor to ensure that 
the terms of the Decree are implemented. I was appointed as part of the Monitoring Team to 
help enforce the Decree. See Department of Justice Appoints Squire Patton Boggs as 
Independent Monitor for the City of Ferguson, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (July 25, 2016), 
http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/news/2016/07/department-of-justice-appoints-squire-patton-
boggs-as-independent-monitor-for-the-city-of-ferguson. 
 19. See, e.g., NAT’L CENT. FOR STATE COURTS, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS: BEST 
PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (2015), available at http://www.sji.gov/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 
Missouri-Municipal-Court-Best-Practices-Recommendations-Final-Report-2015.pdf. 
 20. See S.B. 5, 2015 Legis. Sess. (Mo. 2015), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/ 
15info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=160. Senate Bill 5 (SB 5) was signed into 
law by the Governor of Missouri on July 9, 2015. This law was passed with overwhelming 
bipartisan support and in record speed. See also Gov. Nixon Signs Landmark Municipal Court 
Reform Legislation, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR JAY NIXON (July 9, 2015), https://governor.mo.gov/ 
news/archive/gov-nixon-signs-landmark-municipal-court-reform-legislation. The bill most 
notably capped the ability of most municipalities to keep the revenue from traffic violations to 
20 percent of their general operating revenue; St. Louis County was capped at a much lower 
rate of 12.5 percent. It also capped fines and court costs for minor traffic offenses at $300, and 
it precluded the ability to sentence people to jail for inability to pay a fine; see also Marshall 
Griffin, Missouri Legislature Sends Municipal Court Changes to the Governor, ST. LOUIS PUB. 
RADIO (May 7, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-legislature-sends-municipal-
court-changes-governor. A judge overturned major portions of SB 5 on March 28, 2016. See 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction, City of Normandy v. Nixon, Case No. 15AC-CC00531 
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/fv/c//Judgment+and+ Permanent+Injunction_ 
FINAL.pdf?l=OSCDB0024_CT19&di=771741. In a 3¼ page decision, Circuit Judge Jon 
Beetem granted the permanent injunction request of the twelve municipalities (municipal 
plaintiffs) within the 21st Judicial Circuit who alleged that the provisions of the law that limited 
the amount of revenue they could collect from minor traffic violations to 12.5 percent, while 
allowing the rest of the county a higher limit of 20 percent, were unconstitutional. The court so 
found, ruling that singling out municipalities in the 21st Judicial District for such treatment—
the law applies only to “any city, town, or village located in any country with a charter form of 
government and with more than nine hundred fifty thousand inhabitants”—was “a special law 
as to which defendants offered no evidence of substantial justification in violation of Article III 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Missouri Supreme Court to weigh in.
21
 The court responded with the 
creation of the Municipal Division Work Group in May of 2015. By 
the time the work group was created, a voluminous amount of 
material had already been compiled. In addition to receiving letters 
from the public, lawyers, judges, national organizations, and various 
local groups including the Commission, the group held three of its 
own public hearings. The group met on numerous occasions and 
ultimately issued its final report to the court on March 1, 2016.
22
 
That report, including my separate opinion and dissent, is 140 
pages.
23
 I will not summarize that majority report here. It is available 
online.
24
 This Article both shares and expands on my dissenting 
opinion to that Final Report. My Dissent followed virtually all of the 
recommendations we read, heard, and otherwise received from the 
DOJ, the Ferguson Commission, Better Together, the National Center 
for State Courts, ArchCity Defenders, various media outlets and the 
overwhelming majority of the testimony our work group heard at all 
three public hearings about the kinds of changes the Missouri 
Supreme Court should make to restore justice and faith in its judicial 
system. The overwhelming calls for justice centered on two key 
 
Section 40 of the Missouri Constitution.” The judge also found that the law included unfunded 
mandates in violation of Missouri’s Constitution. Id. The judge did not elaborate. Jennifer S. 
Mann & Jeremy Kohler, Judge Sides with St. Louis County Cities that Claimed Municipal 
Court Reform Law Is Unfair, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-sides-with-st-louis-county-cities-that-claimed-municipal/ 
article_b1b75039-4dd9-5325-890f-35535561cafa.html. I noted this issue of differing limits on 
the last page of my Dissent and suggested that the Missouri Supreme Court recommend to the 
legislature that it change the revenue limit to either 12.5 percent for all or 20 percent for all. See 
infra note 125. The State Attorney General has appealed this ruling directly to the Missouri 
Supreme Court. Given that there are literally hundreds of so called special laws on the books in 
the state, upholding this ruling will have far reaching consequences on laws already on the 
books throughout the state of Missouri. Jeremy Kohler, Ruling on Municipal Court Reform Law 
Puts Focus on ‘Special Laws,’ ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ruling-on-municipal-court-reform-law-puts-focus-on- special/ 
article_6b552c24-9ab6-5101-bedd-b4e8e23cfe3f.html. 
 21. Members of the public, the Commission, local newspapers like the St. Louis Post 
Dispatch and the St. Louis American, organizations like the NCSC and even the Missouri 
legislature looked to the Missouri Supreme Court for reforms. See, e.g., NAT’L CENT. FOR 
STATE COURTS, supra note 19 and infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 22. MUNICIPAL DIVISION WORK GROUP, REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAL DIVISION WORK 
GROUP TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI (2016), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
page.jsp?id=98094.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/12
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issues: (1) the consolidation of municipal courts, and (2) resolving 
the appearance of impropriety that exists when lawyers preside as 
municipal court judges in some municipalities some days (or nights) 
and appear as prosecutors in other municipalities in the same county 
on other days (or nights).
25
 There were other concerns raised; my 
Dissent addressed and incorporated all.  
The most impactful part of my thirty-two page Dissent was my 
belief that the Missouri Supreme Court has the power to and should 
consolidate some of the municipal courts into larger, more 
functionally-efficient and just courts. Although I was the sole 
member of the group to voice aloud this conclusion, my 
recommendation was founded on the undisputed fact that nothing in 
the Missouri Constitution forbids the court from consolidating 
inferior courts under its jurisdiction (i.e., all courts under the 
Missouri Supreme Court, including municipal courts). The Missouri 
Supreme Court is superior to all courts in the state and has the 
constitutional power to create rules and enact procedures to supervise 
and govern all inferior courts in the state.
26
 Consolidation does not 
mean abolish but it certainly means reduce, where necessary, to make 
more efficient and in the interests of justice.  
My Dissent referenced some of the costs involved to maintain 
these courts.
27
 Many of these municipalities are quite small, but the 
yearly costs of their municipal court judge and municipal prosecutor 
alone can be high.
28
 Consider Berkeley, a municipality of 
 
 25. See, e.g., NAT’L CENT. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 19 and infra notes 64–69 and 
accompanying text; Peter Joy, Lawyers Serving as Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Lawyers 
at the Same Time: Legal Ethics and Municipal Court, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23 (2016). 
 26. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 28. See “Municipalities with Courts in the 21st Judicial District, State of Missouri & the 
Salaries Paid to its Judges and Prosecutors,” Exhibit 2 hereto. The figures represented in this 
chart are just a portion of the municipal court related expenses. I complied this chart after 
sending Sunshine Act requests to the appropriate municipal government employees. Under the 
Missouri Sunshine Act, upon receipt of such a request, the government has three days to 
respond. MO. REV. STAT. § 610.023.3 (2015). Not all responded as required under law within 
the three days, nor by the time this Article went to print. This failure to respond, or to give the 
public the “run-around,” or to charge exorbitant fees to “research” for the requested 
information, is another travesty of justice. State governments and legislatures should consider 
putting real “teeth” into violations and abuses concerning information that the public has a right 
to know.  
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approximately nine thousand people. It pays over $100,000 a year to 
its municipal court judge and prosecutor; the court itself operates 
twice a month!
29
 These figures put tremendous pressure on small 
municipalities to somehow raise the revenue. It begs the question: 
should such a small municipality really have its own court?  
As power and politics go, many lawyers and judges are not in 
favor of consolidation. If a particular court is folded into another, that 
means a prosecutor and a judge, and likely others affiliated with the 
consolidated court, will lose their jobs. I understand that. Yet, the 
question remains how small is too small? At what point is a court too 
small to effectively dispense justice? There certainly are strong 
arguments, and indeed the record before the Municipal Court 
Working Group was filled with arguments, that courts operating once 
or twice a month for a few hours an evening coupled with substantial 
salaries paid to the judges and prosecutors in these courts are too 
heavy a load on the communities bearing the burden to maintain 
these courts. Not one municipal court in the 21st Judicial District 
operates anything near a full-time court. These courts operate a few 
hours a day for typically only one or two days per month.
30
 The 
lawyers working as prosecutors and judges in these courts are not full 
time. These municipal court jobs are not only part time jobs, but they 
are often supplemental to some other “real” job the lawyer or judge 
has.  
No one wants to lose income but if you read this Article and its 
accompanying footnotes carefully, you will see that some of these 
municipalities are simply too small to justify their existence and 
indeed, are unsustainable if the cost of operation means overly 
aggressive ticketing, dehumanization, and constitutional violations of 
the community where the court sits.  
 
 29. Exhibit 2. Kinloch has approximately two hundred residents. It cannot afford car 
insurance for the police cars driven by its police officers. See Editorial, Kinloch Residents 
Should Vote to Dissolve the Municipality, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-kinloch-residents-should-
vote-to-dissolve-the-municipality/article_f7f0607b-fc6b-5e15-b710-c66b2266caa2.html. Despite 
inability to pay for car insurance (and allowing its officers to drive around in uninsured cars in 
violation of Missouri state law), the municipality pays approximately $15,000 per year for one 
court session a month for the salaries of just two people. Id.  
 30. See Exhibit 2. Approximately twelve of the seventy-six or so courts operate three to 
four sessions per month. One municipality advised that it operates seven sessions per month. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/12
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I have been told by many lawyers—black and white alike—that 
blacks who comprise a majority in some of the municipalities in the 
21st Judicial District of Missouri will suffer under consolidation. The 
theory is that if courts consolidate, blacks will lose power, and maybe 
jobs. To be clear, I have not argued that the Missouri Supreme Court 
can, should or even has the power to consolidate municipalities.
31
 
Nothing I have recommended concerns the Court’s power over 
municipalities or how those municipalities elect their mayor, appoint 
their police chief or otherwise run their cities. Indeed, my argument is 
that the Missouri Supreme Court can consolidate municipal courts 
without having any effect on the mayor or police chief or their staff. 
Additionally, let’s be clear: the municipal court judges and lawyers in 
the predominately Black municipalities that bear the brunt of many of 
these costs are overwhelmingly White and male—not bastions of 
black power by any stretch of the imagination.
32
 Rather, the 
resounding demands the work group heard and read of many black 
residents in the majority black municipalities demanded abolition of 
municipal courts, or alternatively, consolidation. The people in these 
communities want justice and fairness in the courts, not injustice and 
unfairness for the sake of retaining an illusion of black power. 
Virtually all of the data presented to the work group on municipal 
court (in)justice in the 21st Judicial District evidenced thousands and 
thousands of poor and black people suffering under a broken and 
very unfair court ystem. If the price of justice for thousands means 
that a few dozen people will lose their jobs—supplemental five- and 
six-figure jobs in the case of the judges and lawyers—then many 
have weighed in and have concluded that this is a price is worth 
paying. No longer should thousands continue to suffer to maintain the 
status quo of a few.  
My Dissent also speaks to the practice in Missouri that not only 
allows municipal court judges to practice law but also allows them to 
 
 31. MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 5. See infra note 108. 
 32. For the racial and gender breakdown of municipal court judges and prosecutors in the 
St. Louis region, see BETTER TOGETHER STL, PUBLIC SAFETY, MUNICIPAL COURTS, JUDGES 
AND PROSECUTORS ADDENDUM (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/BT-Judges-and-Prosecutors-Report-FINAL1.pdf [hereinafter BETTER 
TOGETHER JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS]. The racial and gender breakdowns for 2016 are 
virtually unchanged. 
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prosecute cases. As detailed infra, there are eighty-one municipal 
courts in the 21st Judicial District of Missouri.
33
 One person can be a 
municipal court judge in multiple municipalities in the same circuit.
34
 
That same person can also prosecute cases and even also be the city 
attorney in other municipalities in the same judicial circuit. A defense 
lawyer facing a prosecutor s/he knows is his or her judge the next 
night in a different municipality might be more deferential to the 
prosecutor than zealous advocacy requires. Yes, ethical standards 
govern how judges are to decide cases but let us not forget that these 
judges are people and egos can sometimes cloud the best of efforts. 
The contentious aftereffects of battle between a prosecutor and 
defense attorney can linger in the air when that prosecutor is later 
sitting as a judge, on a different case, on a different day but with the 
same defense attorney from the day before.
35
 Imagine, too, the 
appearance of impropriety to the many residents who, because they 
are ticketed in multiple jurisdictions, see a person acting as a 
 
 33. The next highest number is twenty-five. See infra note 62. 
 34. See infra notes 86, 88. 
 35. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 2 contains the Code of Judicial Conduct. Among other 
things, the rule requires judges to be fair, impartial and to avoid bias. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 2 
(2012), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=667. It also provides that judges 
“shall” recuse “himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to . . . (1) the judge has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a . . . party’s lawyer.” Id. at R. 2-2.11 (Recusal). Recusals in municipal 
courts are so rare that they are unheard of. This, in my view, has a lot to do with the fact that the 
rule relies on the judge to make the determination about recusal. It is not uncommon for people 
to honestly deny partiality or bias. An entire science on implicit (i.e., unconscious), bias, not 
only exists, but affects judges. See, e.g., The Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of 
Implicit Bias?, 54 NO. 4 JUDGES’ J. 20 (2015); Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 
102 Ill. BAR J. 40 (Jan. 2014); Jeffrey Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Blinking on a 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). I co-chaired the Implicit Bias 
subcommittee of the American Bar Association 360 Commission on Diversity and Inclusion. 
This Commission created by American Bar Association President Paulette Brown, produced 
substantial materials dealing with diversity and inclusion. The Implicit Bias committee of the 
Commission produced materials for judges, prosecutors and public defenders, to help these 
lawyers become more alert about the presence of unconscious bias and to help provide tools to 
disrupt unintentional biases that can lead to injustice. For more on the work on this 
Commission, see Diversity & Inclusion 360 Commission, ABA, www.ambar.org/ 
360commission (last accessed Sept. 14, 2016).  
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prosecutor in one court but as the judge in another.
36
 Consider a third 
conflict: like private prisons with incentives to make sure the prisons 
are full, municipal court judges are pressured to keep revenues to the 
municipality flowing in. Consider this observation made fifty years 
ago and still a real issue today: 
Fines collected from municipal ordinance violators . . . are paid 
into the treasury of the city or town. In addition, costs collected 
from such municipal violations are paid in to municipal 
coffers. 
 That the municipal judge is subjected to a conflict of 
interest between his duties to the municipality and to the 
system of law, under these circumstances has long been 
recognized. At common law, according to Dillion, it was 
settled as to municipal courts “that the municipal corporation 
could bring no action therein against a stranger where the 
effect would be to benefit the corporate or increase its funds, 
for that would be to make the corporation itself both judge and 
party.” This doctrine has long since been abandoned, but the 
conflict which created it remains.
37
  
There is also the matter of adequate facilities. Many of the municipal 
court buildings are too small to allow the hundreds of people called 
before the court on limited court days inside.
38
 The conditions in the 
holding cells are horrific and likely unconstitutional.
39
 And yes, there 
is also the matter of jailing of people who cannot afford to pay their 
fines, fees and bail, a clear violation of the law.
40
 On multiple levels, 
 
 36. This practice also allows a single law firm to have multiple lawyers wearing all of 
these hats (prosecutor, city attorney and judge) all in the same judicial circuit. See infra note 88 
and accompanying text. 
 37. See Lauer, supra note 1, at 89–90 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Not only is 
there a clear conflict here (see, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, on the pressure to 
raise revenue to pay the judges and other staff), but as I state in my Dissent, infra, it is 
unconstitutional for a municipality to keep fines and penalties in its coffers. I rely on Missouri 
Supreme Court precedent for this conclusion. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 38. See infra notes 106, 107. 
 39. See infra note 107. 
 40. See, e.g., J. Weston Phippen, The U.S. Government’s Warning to Courts That Jail The 
Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/ 
03/department-of-justice-open-letter/473742/. Given the frequency within which people are 
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the system as it currently exists in the 21st Judicial District of 
Missouri is inefficient, unfair, and unjust.
41
  
Thousands of people have lost their jobs, homes, children, and are 
humiliated under the current system of municipal court justice as it 
exists in some judicial districts in the state of Missouri. Self-
regulation has not worked; therefore telling the judges to simply 
 
jailed around the country, including in Missouri, Phippen’s article is worth quoting here at some 
length: 
 The U.S. Department of Justice has sent a rare open letter to state judges asking 
them to stop practices that threaten jail time for people who cannot afford to pay fines. 
 The letter, sent Monday, is signed by Vanita Gupta, the top prosecutor for the 
Justice Department, and Lisa Foster, who runs a division focused on helping poor 
people gain access to legal aid. At issue in the letter is a system in which courts 
threaten people who haven’t paid their fines––sometimes for traffic tickets, 
misdemeanors, or civil offenses––with jail time. Such practices, the letter said, makes 
courts seem as if they’re not concerned with “addressing public safety, but rather 
toward raising revenue.” In many cases those practices can be unlawful, the letter said, 
and in jurisdictions that take federal money, they may also violate the Civil Rights Act 
when courts “unnecessarily impose disparate harm on the basis of race or national 
origin.” 
 The letter listed several practices that may violate a person’s due process, like jailing 
people because they can’t pay fines; making fines a prerequisite for a judicial hearing; 
and using bail or bond practices that leave poor people in jail only because they can’t 
afford to pay for their release. 
 The letter noted that these policies can force people into debt, land them in jail 
despite posing no risk to the community, and capture them “in cycles of poverty that 
can be nearly impossible to escape.” 
 In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that if someone is too poor to pay a fine, jailing 
them violates federal law. But Monday’s letter hinted that not all courts are following 
that ruling.  
 Such a recommendation to courts from the Justice Department is rare. The last the 
department wrote a similar letter was in 2010, when it reminded state courts they were 
required, and legally obligated, to provide court interpreters to non-English speakers 
(that concern led to investigations in Colorado and North Carolina).  
Id. 
 41. See Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Condemns Profit-Minded Court Policies Targeting 
the Poor, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/us/politics/justice-
dept-condemns-profit-minded-court-policies-targeting-the-poor.html?_r=0. In an unusual move, 
the DOJ sent a letter across the nation to all chief judges of state courts and court administrators 
calling on them “to root out unconstitutional policies that have locked poor people in a cycle of 
fines, debt and jail. It was the Obama administration’s latest effort to take its civil rights agenda 
to the states, which have become a frontier in the fight over the rights of the poor and the 
disabled, the transgender and the homeless.” Id.  
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follow the law, as the Work Group report does, falls well short of 
what was and is needed.  
 The Missouri Supreme Court has the constitutional power to 
control all courts in its jurisdiction—this includes all inferior courts 
and thus all municipal courts. If it cannot control its own courts, who 
can? Who will?
42
 
POSTSCRIPT: EVENTS POST MARCH 1, 2016: 
Since the Report of the Work Group and my separate Dissent was 
submitted to the Missouri Supreme Court on March 1, 2016, several 
relevant things have happened that must be noted here: First, a 
Missouri judge virtually gutted much of the widely hailed SB 5 law 
that reduced the revenue that a municipality can receive from traffic 
violations.
43
 As outlined infra, municipalities were originally 
obligated to limit their revenue from minor traffic violations to 30 
percent of their budget per year. That was changed under Senate Bill 
5. Among other things, SB 5 limited said revenue to 20 percent in St. 
Louis County generally but 12.5 percent in the eighty-odd 
municipalities located within St. Louis Count.
44
 The judge took issue, 
as I do in my Dissent,
45
 with different limits being applied (20 
percent in some areas as compared to a 12.5 percent limit in other 
 
 42. See, e.g., Statement from Commission Co-Chairs Rev Starsky Wilson and Rich 
McClure, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON (Mar. 22, 2016), forwardthrough ferguson.org/get-
involved/statement-scomo-action. Although their duties as co-chairs of the Ferguson 
Commission ended in December of 2016, the co-chairs, felt the need to respond to the 
Municipal Division Work Group Report of March 1, 2016 by urging, again, the Court to adopt 
its recommendations for change by the Court. See also Dave Leipholtz, Op-Ed, Reforming the 
Broken Municipal Court System, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Apr 7, 2016), http://m.stltoday. 
com/news/opinion/reforming-the-broken-municipal-court-system/article_103b4205-ec23-5393-
a8f4-40280c4588b5.html; Tony Messenger, Note to Supreme Court—There Is a Name Behind 
Every Ticket, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ 
columns/tony-messenger/messenger-note-to-supreme-court-there-is-a-name-behind/article_257 
d57f6-f93e-5bb6-b2d4-a676219159ee.html. Editorial, Missouri Supreme Court Must Reject 
Half-Way Reforms of Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www. 
stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-missouri-supreme-court-must-reject-
half-way-reforms-of/article_d830e082-6867-59e2-84e0-b11b16b59a00.html; Editorial, Court 
Should Heed Norwood’s Dissenting Opinion, ST. LOUIS AMERICAN (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www. 
stlamerican.com/news/editorials/article_ee6b060-e0d8-11e5-9fd3-2bd5a86dab99.html.  
 43. See, e.g., Mann & Kohler, supra note 20.  
 44. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 45. Id.  
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areas). That decision is still making its way through the court system. 
Second, the Missouri legislature, with the passage of SB 572, 
widened the scope of SB 5 to include revenue limitations on all 
municipal ordinance violations (e.g., grass too high, manner of 
walking) and not just minor traffic violations.
46
 Third, I attended an 
Annual Meeting of the Missouri Municipal and Associate Circuit 
Judges Association in May of 2016. Attorney Timothy R. Schnacke 
has written two reports published by the National Institute of 
Corrections and these reports conclusively establish that bail was a 
remedy instituted to bail people out of jail of and not keep people in 
jail.
47
 The current use of the bail/bond system works to create more 
harm to families, communities and society and has actually no 
relationship to safety. Indeed, the person who is able to post bail or 
bond and get out of jail presents whatever danger that person 
presented before they posted the money and has zero relationship to 
the threat to public safety. Moreover, these reports establish that there 
is no relationship to the posting of money and whether the person is 
more likely to return to court. Rather, the report establishes other 
more trusted and proven measures to increase the likelihood of 
courtroom attendance; measures that are totally divorced from how 
much money a person (or that person’s family and/or friends) 
has/have and is/are able to post.
48
  
The Missouri Supreme Court also took action on the conflicts of 
interest issue. As laid out in my Dissent, infra, there was tremendous 
concern by virtually all who testified before our Committee and 
indeed, by a clear majority of the committee itself, that not only the 
appearance of impropriety suffers when a judge one night is allowed 
to be a prosecutor in the same county another night and also even a 
defense lawyer in the same county on yet another night, it just is 
 
 46. See SB 572, Open:States, http://openstates.org/mo/bills/2016/SB572/ (last accessed 
Sept. 10, 2016).  
 47. See NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., MONEY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE 
JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A DEFENDANT PRETRIAL (Sept. 2014), available at 
https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Money%20as%20a%20Criminal%20Justice%20St
akeholder.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM (Aug. 
2014), available at http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_ 
september_8,_2014.pdf. 
 48. See supra note 47. 
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simply ineffectual (as evidenced by the fact that none ever do in these 
situations) to rely on the municipal court judge to recuse himself 
when he is facing either a judge he will appear before as prosecutor 
or when he is facing a defense lawyer he engaged in a heated debate 
with in his role as prosecutor.
49
 The new conflicts rule adopted by the 
Missouri Supreme Court on June 27, 2016 still falls short.
50
  
It places no restriction on the ability of a lawyer to be both a 
prosecutor and a defense attorney in different municipalities in the 
same county; it places no limit on the ability of a lawyer to be both a 
prosecutor and the city attorney in the same municipality; and with 
respect to the limit it places on the ability of a lawyer to be a 
prosecutor in one municipality in a county and a judge in another 
municipality in the same county, it contains unclear language about 
the circumstances under which any recusal shall occur.
51
 
 
 49. See infra notes 80–107 and accompanying text.  
 50. Order of June 27, 2016, MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.53(b) (2016), http://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
sup/index.nsf/d45a7635d4bfdb8f8625662000632638/dd4f5c13d39fd00686257fe20066c497? 
OpenDocument (emphasis added).  
 51. The full text of the new rule provides as follows: 
In re:  
Repeal of subdivision 37.53(b), entitled “Without Application,” of Rule 
37, entitled “Statutory and Ordinance Violations and Violation Bureaus,” 
and in lieu thereof adoption of a new subdivision 37.53(b), entitled 
“Without Application.” 
O R D E R 
It is ordered that effective January 1, 2017, subdivision 37.53(b) of Rule 
37 be and the same is hereby repealed and a new subdivision 37.53(b) 
adopted in lieu thereof to read as follows: 
37.53 Ordinance Violation Cases Not Heard on the Record - 
Disqualification and Change of Judge 
* * *  
(b)Without Application. The judge shall recuse:  
(1) When the judge is related to any defendant, when the judge has an 
interest in the case, or when the judge previously has been counsel in the 
case; or 
(2) When the attorney representing the prosecuting county or 
municipality in the case regularly serves as a judge in another 
municipal division located within the same county before whom the 
judge regularly represents a prosecuting county or municipality. 
Id.  
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Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court revised the Rule governing 
municipal court practice on September 20, 2016.
52
 It lists a series of 
what are identified therein as “minimum standards.” This language is 
helpful. It is good to have a floor. The revision does speak to 
separation of court clerk staff from police staff; it provides that courts 
should be open to the public and adequately spaced and staffed for 
the job they are supposed to do; it provides that people should not be 
jailed for inability to pay and that ability to pay determination be 
made. It limits the amount of time a person can be held in jail on 
minor traffic offenses. It requires clerks to be open thirty hours per 
week.  
Indeed, the sixteen page order is detailed but it still falls far short. 
Its’ biggest flaw is its failure to consolidate any of the eighty-odd 
municipal courts. The Order not only does not go into effect until the 
middle of 2017, leaving long months of continued harassment and 
pain, but it also has no teeth. It provides nothing in the way of 
remedy or protocol should a court or judge or prosecutor violate its 
provisions. Moreover, and quite ironically, it simply restates existing 
law! It was already illegal to jail people for inability to pay; it was 
already required that the courts be open to the public; it was already 
required that ability to pay inquiries be had. Presiding judges are 
given a few monitors. There are over eighty municipal courts in the 
21st judicial district. The presiding judge there needs a lot more help 
than the presiding judge of next largest area of twenty municipal 
courts. And indeed, as Brendan Roediger, associate law professor at 
St. Louis University Law School recently noted: “The presiding 
judge and the Supreme Court don’t have the inclination or the time to 
supervise these courts . . . . What we need are rules that can be 
enforced in an individual case.”53 The Court’s Order does not provide 
for that.  
 
 52. See Order Dated September 20, 2016, re: Rule 37.04, MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.04 (2016), 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/sup/index.nsf/d45a7635d4bfdb8f8625662000632638/c908dc068188
4e13862580340051c22b?OpenDocument.  
 53. Jeremy Kohler, Missouri Supreme Court Issues New Rules for Municipal Courts, ST. 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/missouri-supreme-court-issues-new-rules-for-municipal-courts/article_eadba97f-c1c2-5e 
22-a34a-29278ee631f4.html. 
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There is not much of anything actually new in this order. Indeed, 
one comment is quite telling: “I don’t see any problem with these,” 
said Bryan Dunlop, a lawyer who works as a municipal judge in 
Maplewood and Beverly Hills. “We’ve been operating with these for 
a long time.”54 Read the DOJ report on the Ferguson Police 
Department; those from Better Together, the National Center for 
State Courts, and The Ferguson Commission; my Dissent. Many of 
the courts have, indeed, been operating under those rules for a long 
time. The problem is many of those municipal courts are not 
following those rules.
55
  
My Dissent—still relevant, unfortunately—is reproduced below.56  
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., supra notes 19–22. Indeed, the Chief justice of the Missouri Supreme Court 
shared her own experiences how those court “operate” as lawyer/municipal court judge Brian 
Dunlop puts it. Consider the following: 
 In a speech Thursday to members of the Missouri Bar Association, Chief Justice 
Patricia Breckenridge said she had showed up unannounced at several municipal 
courts and found problems. 
 A recorded greeting for one court said it was open until 4 p.m., but a sign on the 
door said it was closed at 1. Some courts said children were not welcome 
“despite the Constitution and a not-so-gentle reminder from the presiding judge 
that courts are to be open to the public,” she said. 
 At one court, court clerks wore jackets with police logos, “visually illustrating the 
lack of separation of the executive branch police from the judicial branch court.” 
 At another court, she said, the prosecutor was seated behind the bench with the 
judge during court proceedings. (Through a spokeswoman, Breckenridge said she 
would not identify the courts she had visited.) 
“I experienced firsthand what citizens in our state must encounter every day,” she said. “I felt 
frustrated and angry.” Kohler, supra note 53. So much for rules with no teeth. Before long we 
will be back to business as usual and that is very sad for the St. Louis metropolitan community. 
 56. My Dissent is reproduced below as it was submitted to the Missouri Supreme Court 
on March 1, 2016 with two exceptions. Because I have added two exhibits to this Article, the 
exhibit numbers in the Dissent have changed slightly to reflect the additions. Additionally, 
because the Dissent is reproduced after my Introduction, all footnote numbers are changed.  
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SEPARATE OPINION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT MUNICIPAL DIVISION 
WORKING GROUP MEMBER KIMBERLY NORWOOD
 
INTRODUCTION 
I both concur with and dissent from the Missouri Supreme Court 
Municipal Working Group Final Report (hereinafter “Final Report”). 
I believe there are underlying systemic problems in the Missouri 
municipal justice system, which hears and decides virtually two-
thirds of all cases in the state. In my view, the Final Report falls short 
of making the type and number of recommendations needed to 
adequately address the problems and begin the process of restoring 
faith in and bringing integrity back to our municipal courts.  
Under the Constitution of Missouri, all of the municipal courts 
(including those of St. Louis County) are divisions of the circuit 
courts and under the administration of the presiding circuit judge and 
the supervisory and superintending authority of the Supreme Court of 
Missouri. Many of Missouri residents who find themselves in court 
are likely to be in a municipal court. Municipal courts in Missouri 
resolve approximately 65% of all cases in the state.
57
 In 2014, these 
divisions disposed of more than 1.4 million cases—twice as many as 
in all other circuit divisions.
58
 For most people who interact with the 
Missouri judicial system, the municipal courts are the face of the 
system.  
The state has a whopping 595 municipal courts (with a whopping 
955 municipalities).
59
 These courts are spread across 45 judicial 
 
 57. ARTHUR W. PEPIN, FOUR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO DELIVER JUSTICE IN 
LIMITED JURISDICTION COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2014), available at http://cosca.ncsc. 
org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/2013-2014-Policy-Paper-Limited-
Jurisdiction-Courts-in-the-21st-Century.ashx [hereinafter COSCA 2013–14 LIMITED 
JURISDICTION REPORT] (“Across the country, limited jurisdiction courts resolve 66 percent of 
all cases in all state courts, or about 70 million of 106 million cases that enter the state court 
system annually.”). 
 58. Patricia Breckenridge, Missouri’s Chief Justice Delivers 2016 State of the Judiciary 
Address, JUD. BRANCH OF ST. GOV’T (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
page.jsp?id=96693 [hereinafter Breckenridge 2016 State of the Judiciary Address]. 
 59. When one considers the ratio of number of governments/ per capita, Missouri is quite 
fragmented. See, e.g., Mike Maciag, Which States Have Most Fragmented Local 
Governments?, GOVERNING THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www. 
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circuits. Of the 595 municipal courts, 427 are independently operated 
by their respective municipalities and 168 are conducted via circuit 
courts by associate circuit judges.
60
 A small number operate on a full 
time basis; the vast majority operates on a part time basis.
61
 The 45 
judicial circuits have vastly different numbers of municipal divisions.  
The problems in the state’s municipal justice system are most 
visible in (but, not limited to) the 21st Judicial Circuit, which 
includes about 90 different municipalities—some taking up less than 
a square mile radius—and contains 81 municipal divisions. This 
number, 81, is three to sixteen times more than any of the other 
judicial circuits in the state.
62
 And, in this lone judicial district of 81 
municipalities, the municipal court problems are most acute.
63
 In 
these 81 courts, prosecutorial and judicial behavior ranges from good 
to abysmal. Moreover, when we examine the record developed in 
various reports of this system of “justice” in St. Louis County, one 
thing is clear, unmistakable, and disgraceful: There are two systems 
of justice in the county—one for White and middle class residents 
and the other for poor and mostly Black residents.
64
 
 
governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/local-government-consolidation-fragmentation.html#data. 
For a picture of Missouri’s fragmented governments see Maciag, supra. See also Colin Gordon, 
Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Governance and Urban Decline in Greater St. Louis, 34 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV 51 (2014). 
 60. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL COURTS: BEST 
PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (2015), available at http://www.sji.gov/wp/wp-content/ 
uploads/Missouri-Municipal-Court-Best-Practices-Recommendations-Final-Report-2015.pdf 
[hereinafter NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS] at 9–10 n.11. 
 61. Columbia, Kansas City, St. Louis City and Springfield operate full time municipal 
courts. 
 62. The 4th Judicial Circuit has the next highest amount with twenty-five municipal 
courts; the 32nd and 36th Judicial Circuits have five municipal courts each; and the 22nd 
Judicial Circuit has just one municipal division. See Your Missouri Courts, JUD. BRANCH OF ST. 
GOV’T, https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1880 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 63. The problems with municipal court efficiency, justice and fairness extend beyond the 
21nd Judicial Circuit however. See, e.g., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, IT’S NOT JUST FERGUSON: 
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONSOLIDATE THE MUNICIPAL COURT SYSTEM (2014), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/274501398/It-s-Not-Just-Ferguson-Consolidate-the-
Municipal-Courts-1#scribd [hereinafter NOT JUST FERGUSON]. See also Jennifer S. Mann, 
Audits Show That Municipal Court Problems Extend Beyond St. Louis County, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Feb. 14, 2016), http://m.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/audits-show-
municipal-court-problems-extend-beyond-st-louis-county/article_6d3bea5b-42ae-556f-b819-
ea52237a4626.html?mobile_touch=true [hereinafter Audits Show]. 
 64. See, e.g., Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County Mo., Profit from 
Poverty, Sept. 3, 2014 WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ the-
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Race and, to a lesser extent, economic status fuel the dysfunction 
of municipal court divisions in St. Louis County.
65
 While some want 
to think that this problem just arose in August of 2014 with the 
killing of unarmed teenager Michael Brown, the reality is that 
lawyers, particularly lawyers in the St. Louis region, have known 
about the various abuses in the municipal system for more than half a 
century, especially the disparate treatment of people of color and the 
poor; the use of tickets to raise money for tax-poor communities; the 
misuse of warrants, bail, and failure-to-appear charges; and the 
 
watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty/. See also Whitney 
Benns & Black Strode, Debtors’ Prison in 21st-Century America, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/debtors-prison/462378/: 
Walk into one of these courts on any given day—in Ferguson, Pagedale, Pine Lawn, 
Hazelwood, St. Ann, or easily 40 other municipalities across St. Louis County—and 
there will be row after row of poor black residents who have been called in to pay 
penitence for their wrongdoing. Some who are unable to pay are taken straight to the 
local jail. More often, when people fail to appear because they know that they cannot 
pay, arrest warrants are issued. Days, weeks, months, or even years later (often times 
during a routine traffic stop), they will be arrested and taken to jail on this warrant, 
with the threat of continued confinement serving as a new incentive for immediate 
payment, no matter the resultant hardships of securing such funds. Detentions 
stemming from unpaid municipal fines can last anywhere from minutes to weeks or, in 
extreme cases, even months. This is the reality of the local justice system for some of 
the most vulnerable residents of Greater St. Louis. 
Id. 
 65. What brought race to the forefront were the well-documented reports of the Justice 
Department, Better Together, the ArchCity Defenders, the National Center for State Courts, and 
the exhaustive work of the Ferguson Commission following the shooting death of Michael 
Brown in August 2014. It must be noted, however, that the race connection here is not and was 
not limited to municipalities where Blacks and poor people comprise a majority: 
One of the wealthiest cities in the entire country, Ladue is less than 1 percent black. 
Yet, in 2014 a black driver was 18.5 times more likely to be pulled over than a white 
driver. Following a stop, a black driver was 2.4 times more likely to be searched and 
2.7 times more likely to be arrested. In a disturbing admission in May of last year, the 
city’s former police chief described a conversation with the former mayor in which she 
directed him to target black drivers so that “‘those people’ can see what happens to 
blacks and that we don’t want them here.” (The city has denied the former chief’s 
allegations.). What could possibly explain such use of local police and courts? While a 
city like Ladue does not face the same budgetary demands as many of the revenue-
challenged cities in North County, it is still the product of a broader regional structure 
designed to exclude and oppress. 
Benns & Strode, supra note 8; see also KMOV.com Staff, Former Ladue Police Chief Alleges 
He Was Ordered to Profile Black Motorists, KMOV ST. LOUIS (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.kmov.com/story/28975097/former-ladue-police-chief-alleges-he-was-ordered-to-
profile-Black-motorists.  
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jailing of unrepresented defendants to collect fines and fees.
66
 I 
started working at Washington University in 1990. All throughout the 
1990s and thereafter, I learned from my own experience, and from 
the experience of Washington University law students who 
represented clients in municipal courts, of the abuses on defendants 
in those courts. This pattern has persisted (and has been documented) 
in cases handled by St. Louis University clinical law students and the 
ArchCity Defenders in more recent years. Although for decades, 
lawyers have treated these cases as individual matters, it is hard to 
ignore the outcomes determined by race and economic class that 
occur on a widespread basis in many municipal courts.
67
  
Now that the two faces of justice have been undisputedly 
displayed for all to see, it is the duty of this working group to 
 
 66. See Lauer, supra note 1. In this document, Professor Lauer suggests, among other 
things, that all judges, including municipal court judges be actual lawyers (still not currently 
true), be full time; and be employed by the state to avoid revenue generation concerns. Id. at 96. 
He also suggests because violations of municipal court ordinances are treated as criminal 
matters, although they should not be, public defenders must be appointed for the indigent before 
a person can be incarcerated. Id. at 85, 96  
 67. Interestingly, there are people, including lawyers and municipal court judges, who do 
not acknowledge this. Rather, their response is simply to say to defendants, “Just don’t violate 
the law, and you won’t get in trouble.” Indeed, consider this comment by a municipal judge: 
“There is a segment of society that has decided now they are not going to be 
responsible, and the law doesn’t apply to them,” said Brian Dunlop, a Clayton-based 
lawyer who serves as the Beverly Hills municipal court judge. “That it’s OK to speed, 
OK to drive without license plates and insurance, and why am I being put upon 
because I can’t afford to do those things?” 
Jeremy Kohler, Jennifer Mann & Walker Moskop, For People Living Under Threat of Arrest 
Around St. Louis, A Constant Stress, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/for-people-living-under-threat-of-arrest-
around-st-louis/article_5135fe78-02f4-5ff2-8283-3b7c0b178afc.html. I often wonder who, 
exactly this lawyer/part time municipal court judge has in mind when he refers to that “segment 
of society.” It likely does not include the judges who call prosecutors who help them make their 
tickets disappear. Or people who also break the law but can afford to hire lawyers and simply 
get their tickets fixed. See, e.g., ‘Karr-ruption’ Comes Under Fire in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS 
AMERICAN (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/political_eye/article_19f6039c-
caee-11e5-a476-bfc3e37c27ee.html. Or, is it just the poor who do not have those options?  
 Additionally, we cannot ignore the fact that aggressive ticketing for speeding or other 
municipal ordinance violations vary significantly depending on the needs of the municipality. 
Indeed, “violations are not as widely and strictly enforced in towns that receive plenty of 
revenue from other sources (and whose residents wield sufficient political power to halt such a 
practice in its tracks), and, for another, because the threat of detention does not exist for those 
who can afford to pay the fines associated with minor municipal citations.” Benns & Strode, 
supra note 8. 
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recommend that the Missouri Supreme Court—which has broad 
powers to direct the organization and operations of our unified court 
system—do all it can to correct this horrific system of injustice.68 
Now is the time. The Supreme Court should not allow this critical 
juncture simply to fade from public view with the passage of time; at 
least until the next Michael Brown. 
OUR WORK GROUP CHARGE AND THE CALLS FOR REFORM: 
Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court order dated May 14, 2015, I 
was appointed to a “Supreme Court Municipal Division Work 
Group.”69 The work group was charged by then Chief Justice Mary 
Russell with:  
. . . reviewing all matters relevant to practice in the municipal 
divisions of the circuit court and making recommendations 
concerning any appropriate changes to court rules or practices 
that can be implemented by the Court as well as any 
suggestions that may require legislation or action by other 
entities. 
We received further instruction on September 22, 2015, from 
subsequently appointed Chief Justice Patricia Breckenridge. Her 
letter added to the May 14, 2015, order by asking us to make sure to 
consider four (4) areas in particular: 
A. Propriety of judges, prosecutors and staff service in 
different capacity in multiple municipal divisions. 
B. Consolidation of municipal divisions, including any 
authority of the Supreme Court to mandate consolidation. 
C. Use of warrants, process for setting bonds, and time of 
incarceration. 
 
 68. See Benns & Strode, supra note 8 and DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13 for 
examples of actual horror stories.  
 69. Exhibit 1.  
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D. Enforceability of judgments and remedies for 
nonpayment.
70
 
Additionally, Chief Justice Breckenridge, in her State of the 
Judiciary Address to the Joint Session of the Missouri General 
Assembly in January 2016, stated: 
We all need to do everything we can to ensure that every 
individual in every case in our system of justice is treated with 
respect and his or her case adjudicated fairly and impartially 
according to the law. Until that is true in 100 percent of our 
courts, we cannot rest. Even a perception of justice denied 
anywhere should concern us all, no matter who or where we 
are.
71
 
Missouri citizens must have faith and trust—that in our courts 
they will be treated respectfully and fairly, and that their cases 
will be decided impartially according to the law. . . To the 
people involved, their cases are the most important thing in 
their lives. They remind us that the judicial system’s purpose is 
the fair and impartial resolution of every case.
72
 
Because the Supreme Court has commissioned this working group to 
examine the many flaws of municipal justice throughout the state, I 
firmly believe that nothing less than bold, assertive, aggressive and 
immediate corrections to this flawed system of justice are imperative 
and critical to restoring the public faith and reestablishing the 
integrity of the municipal court system. 
Calls for the reform of the Missouri municipal court system have 
come from many voices, including but not limited to the following: 
—the ArchCity Defenders’ “Municipal Courts White Paper,” 
(Aug 2014),
73
  
 
 70. Letter from Patricia Breckenridge, Chief Justice, Missouri Supreme Court, to 
Municipal Division Work Group (Sept. 22, 2015) (on file with author). 
 71. Breckenridge 2016 State of the Judiciary Address, supra note 58. 
 72. Id.  
 73. THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITEPAPER 
(2014), available at http://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-
Defenders-Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER].  
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—the St. Louis Better Together (“BT”) Report, “Public Safety-
Municipal Courts,” (Oct 2014),74  
—the U.S. Department of Justice report on the Ferguson Police 
Department (March 2015),
75
  
—the Ferguson Commission Report, “Forward Through 
Ferguson: A Path Toward Racial Equality,” (Sept 2015),76  
—the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) report (Nov 
2015),
77
 and 
—the overwhelming testimony at our public hearings.78  
Ironically, many of the calls for reform are near identical to those 
made half a century ago, and are still relevant, necessary, and indeed 
vital today. Although it is clear (and undisputed) that there are 
problems in the 21st Judicial Circuit, it can no longer be credibly 
maintained that the problems in Missouri’s municipal courts only 
exist in the 21st Judicial Circuit.
79
 In order to follow the mandate of 
our Chief Justice, “to ensure that every individual in every case in our 
system of justice is treated with respect and his or her case 
adjudicated fairly and impartially according to the law,” and because 
I do not believe the Final Report does all that it can and should in its’ 
recommendations to the Missouri Supreme Court. I therefore submit 
 
 74. MISSOURI COUNCIL FOR A BETTER ECONOMY, PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS 
(2014), available at http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/BT-
Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1.pdf [hereinafter BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL 
REPORT]. 
 75. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, at 42–62, 68–70, 97–102. 
 76. FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 45. 
 77. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60. See also Carl Reynolds & Jeff Hall, 
2011–2012 POLICY PAPER COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE CENTERS (2012), available at 
http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenu
eCenters-Final.ashx; COSCA 2013-14 LIMITED JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 57. These 
reports, among other things, also address the importance of prohibiting the practice of allowing 
courts to be revenue centers. 
 78. Our work group held three (3) public hearings: one in Springfield, MO on September 
27, 2015; one in St. Louis on November 12, 2015, and one in Kansas City on December 5, 
2015.  
 79. See Audits Show, supra note 63, IT’S NOT JUST FERGUSON, supra note 63; Lauer, 
supra note 1. 
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this separate opinion with what I believe to be crucial 
recommendations. 
MY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are, in fact, several of the 35 or so recommendations 
contained in the Final Report that I agree with. My recommendations 
below both highlight recommendations I believe are crucial and add 
recommendations not covered in the Final Report.  
A) Propriety of judges, prosecutors and staff service in 
different capacity in multiple municipal divisions 
I concur with Section B of the Final Report on Conflicts of 
Interest (identified as “A) Propriety of judges, prosecutors and staff 
service in different capacity in multiple municipal divisions” by 
Chief Justice Breckenridge in her September 22, 2016 
communication to us. I also add hereunder my additional 
recommendations with respect to law firms and court personnel. 
 
Judges: 
 
I agree with the Final Report recommendation: 
RECOMMENDATION: That the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
pursuant to its inherent authority to define the practice of law 
and the authority of Article V, § 4, of the Missouri 
Constitution, amend the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
“Application,” Part III, “Part-Time Municipal Judge, “to create 
a new subsection (B)(4), to read: “practice law in any 
municipal division of the circuit court located within the same 
county or city not within a county as the municipal division of 
the circuit court in which that individual serves as a municipal 
court judge. Further, this prohibition cannot be waived by any 
party to the proceeding.” 
The Advisory Committee of the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
Subcommittee on Municipal Courts concluded that no conflicts of 
laws exist under the current Rules of Professional Conduct, perhaps, 
because conflicts of interest are usually thought of in connection with 
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representing clients or personal interests in matters. However, when 
the public talks about (and experiences) conflicts of interest, they are 
not using the definition/interpretation as proscribed under the Rules 
of Ethics. They are speaking, rather, to the appearance of 
impropriety. That perception is real and has the appearance of a 
“good old boys club”80 that reeks of favoritism special and deals for 
those with special connections and the stench permeates the entire 
system. As my colleague, Peter Joy, notes in his forthcoming 
article
81
: 
A recent news report on municipal courts in St. Louis County, 
Missouri, illustrates multiple role interconnections with a 
diagram consisting of approximately fifty gray lines 
connecting eighteen “lawyers serving as prosecutor or judge in 
the same court or where one of the lawyers was a defense 
attorney in a court where the other was a judge or 
prosecutor.”82 The diagram also includes an additional thirteen 
red lines connecting fourteen of the lawyers to indicate that 
“they each took a turn as defense attorney in the court where 
the other lawyer served as a prosecutor or judge or they serve 
together as prosecutor and judge in one court and in another 
court one was defense attorney and the other was judge or 
prosecutor.”83 Another news report found that thirteen of these 
lawyers held positions as a part-time prosecutor or part-time 
judge in three or more municipalities and twenty lawyers held 
such positions in two municipalities.
84
 Of the eighty-three 
municipalities examined in the latter news report, sixty-nine 
municipalities had at least one “connection” to another 
municipality either through “sharing a judge or prosecutor . . . 
or having a judge or prosecutor who works for the same law 
 
 80. Durrie Bouscaren et al., Overlapping Judges, Prosecutors Weave Tangled Web in St. 
Louis County Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 22, 2015, http://news. 
stlpublicradio.org/post/overlapping-judges-prosecutors-weave-tangled-web-st-louis-county-
municipal-courts. 
 81. Joy, supra note 21. 
 82. Bouscaren, supra note 80.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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firm as a judge or prosecutor in another municipality.”85 The 
lawyers holding these multiple roles apparently see nothing 
wrong about taking on what appear to be conflicting roles.
86
  
Better Together has published reports detailing the very entangled 
relations when one person is allowed to be a municipal court judge in 
multiple counties, and also a city attorney and/or prosecutor in those 
and other courts, and then also occasionally to represent defendants 
all in courts in the same judicial circuit.
87
 Indeed, if one were to look 
at just one law firm for a one-month calendar, the ways in which 
multiple lawyers in this one law firm appear in multiple 
municipalities wearing multiple hats is startling.
88
 This clearly gives 
the appearance, if not the reality, of partiality and unfairness. It reeks 
of the appearance of impropriety and embodies inherent potential for 
conflicts of interest. The NSCS also has recommended that there be 
“strong formal conflict of interest rules for municipal judges.”89 The 
Ferguson Commission Report is in accord.
90
 Indeed, virtually every 
individual and entity, with few exceptions has asked the court to stop 
this revolving door municipal practice.
91
  
Prosecutors: 
I agree with the Final Report recommendation: 
RECOMMENDATION: That the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
pursuant to its inherent authority to define the practice of law 
and the authority of Article V, § 4, of the Missouri 
Constitution, create a new rule within Supreme Court Rule 4, 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann et al., A Web of Lawyers Play Different Roles in Different 
Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2015), available at http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/local/crime-and-courts/a-web-of-lawyers-play-different-roles-in-different-courts/article_ 
b61728d1-09b0-567f-9ff4-919cf4e34649.html (discussing how lawyers holding multiple roles 
do not see any problems with what they are doing); Bouscaren, supra note 81 (providing 
examples of lawyers serving multiple roles who say there is nothing wrong with doing so). 
 87. BETTER TOGETHER JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, supra note 32.  
 88. See infra Exhibit 3. 
 89. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 4, at 70.  
 90. FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 32, 83. 
 91. The exceptions are the input we received from former and current municipal court 
judges, some lawyers and the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court of Missouri. 
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to read: “An attorney shall not serve in more than one of the 
following capacities within the municipal divisions of the 
circuit court located within the same county or city not within 
a county: municipal prosecuting attorney or defense attorney. 
Further, this prohibition cannot be waived by any party to the 
proceeding.” 
For many of the same reasons dealing with the appearance of 
impropriety discussed in report after report after report, and based on 
the same supervisory authority that the Supreme Court has over 
courts, the Court can and should disallow the practice of municipal 
court prosecutors being able to also represent defendants in the same 
county. In both Springfield and in Kansas City, the Missouri 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys [MAPA] sent representatives 
who testified that municipal court prosecutors should be prohibited 
from also representing defendants. As Eric Zahnd, Platte County 
Prosecuting Attorney and MAPA Board of Director President 
testified in Kansas City: 
[N]o municipal prosecutor or assistant municipal prosecutor 
should represent any party other than the state or a political 
subdivision in any criminal or municipal ordinance proceeding 
anywhere in the state of Missouri. Put simply, we believe that 
we should end the game of musical chairs where attorneys 
service in one city as a prosecutor and show up something the 
next night in a neighboring city as a defense attorney. In the 
past we lawyers have found a way to justify that conduct. It’s 
conduct that would be a crime if it was a state prosecutor or a 
state assistant prosecutor who performed the same duties. In 
this working group and the Supreme Court, could certainly 
fashion a way to continue to justify that conduct, but, of 
course, that’s exactly why you all are here tonight and why you 
are holding this hearing because the public no longer accepts 
those lawyerly mental gymnastics. Instead the spotlight is now 
on Municipal Courts as a result of the tragic events of 
Ferguson and we, as members of the bar, are being forced to 
confront the often forgotten stepchildren of courts, those 
Municipal Courts. 
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For too long I would submit we have accepted a lesser 
standard of due process in those courts than we have deemed 
acceptable in our state courts.
92
 
While MAPA would prohibit a municipal court prosecutor from 
being a defense attorney anywhere in the state, I agree with the Final 
Report that the prohibition be limited to the same county or city not 
within a county.
93
  
Law Firms: 
Exhibit 3 represents the various roles lawyers in one law firm can 
play in St. Louis County municipal court practice. This exhibit is 
startlingly and requires mechanisms in place and monitoring to guard 
against the appearance of impropriety. I therefore recommend that the 
Supreme Court require the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel and 
the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges to 
review the ethics of law firms with multiple lawyers serving as 
judges and playing multiple roles in multiple municipalities in one 
county or city not within a county.
94
 
Court Personnel:  
The Final Report, in my view, does not delve into other 
conflicting roles of various court personnel. I would recommend all 
of the following:  
 
 92. Eric Zahnd, Platte County Prosecuting Attorney and MAPA Board of Director 
President, Testimony at the Kansas City Hearing for the Missouri Supreme Court Municipal 
Division Work Group at 4-5 (Dec. 5, 2015) (transcript on file with author); Amy Fete, Christian 
County Springfield Prosecuting Attorney, Testimony at Springfield, Springfield Hearing for the 
Missouri Supreme Court Municipal Division Work Group (Sept. 25, 2015). 
 93. Some might argue that the limit to same county is artificial (and thus ineffective) 
given that adjoining counties are often treated as one; invisible lines are just that, invisible. Yet, 
we know all too well in Missouri that invisible or not, boundary lines matter. One need only 
look at the St. Louis City v. St. Louis County line debates or debates involving the alleged 
importance of maintaining school district boundary lines. The solution in this conflicts context 
(for both judge and prosecutor) is not to do nothing, but (1) at a minimum embrace the same 
county limit and (2) actually even consider expanding the prohibition on multiple hat wearing 
to the same or adjoining county.  
 94. See infra Exhibit 3. 
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1) That the Supreme Court take appropriate steps to create 
judicial independence, as well as independence for court staff 
in the municipal divisions from the municipalities, their police, 
and their city officials. MO Bar Rule 2, Preamble, states “[a]n 
independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our 
system of justice.” Steps to be taken include:  
 i—Disallow or severely restrict the ability for judicial 
employees to split employment or take on tasks for the 
municipal government.
95
 
 ii—Educate judges, municipal officials, and municipal 
court employees on the importance of judicial and court 
employee independence.
96
 
 iii—Prevent targeting and collusion in the municipal 
governance system by requiring principal actors to sign annual 
codes of ethics.
97
  
 iv—Physically and functionally separate court operations 
and staffing from day-to-day interaction with police, 
prosecution, and other city agencies, other than as required; 
eliminate sharing of municipal files and prosecution files.
98
 
 v—Distance judges and prosecutors from any incentives to 
generate revenue (such as creating a shared fine pool for all 
municipal courts).
99
 
2) That the Supreme Court accept the recommendation of the 
Ferguson Commission, Better Together, and the NCSC that 
some independent commission or other Court appointed 
organization be put in place for the appointment and retention 
of municipal court judges.
100
 
 
 95. See, e.g., NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 18–19. 
 96. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 5–8. 
 97. See, e.g., FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10 at 32, 83.  
 98. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 17–18; FERGUSON COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 70. 
 99. BETTER TOGETHER JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, supra note 32, at 1.  
 100. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 5; FERGUSON COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 32, 71; BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5, 
10. 
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3) That the Supreme Court require yearly implicit bias training 
for all judges and court personnel and create a mechanism for 
monitoring.
101
  
4) That the Supreme Court implement a statewide judicial 
code of conduct for municipal court administrative and clerical 
employees and create a mechanism for monitoring.
102
  
 
 101. Chief Justice Breckenridge recently stated that “judges of Missouri’s court system will 
receive implicit bias training as part of this year’s judicial education programs. Breckenridge 
2016 State of the Judiciary Address, supra note 58. My recommendation would (1) require 
yearly training and (2) include court personnel. It should be undisputed that there is a need for 
implicit bias training not just of judges but of court personnel as well. I quote from the DOJ 
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, at 72:  
We have discovered evidence of racial bias in emails sent by Ferguson officials, all of 
whom are current employees, almost without exception through their official City of 
Ferguson email accounts, and apparently sent during work hours. These email 
exchanges involved several police and court supervisors, including FPD supervisors 
and commanders. The following emails are illustrative:  
 A November 2008 email stated that President Barack Obama would not be President 
for very long because “what black man holds a steady job for four years.”  
 A March 2010 email mocked African Americans through speech and familial 
stereotypes, using a story involving child support. One line from the email read: “I be 
so glad that dis be my last child support payment! Month after month, year after year, 
all dose payments!”  
 An April 2011 email depicted President Barack Obama as a chimpanzee.  
 A May 2011 email stated: “An African-American woman in New Orleans was 
admitted into the hospital for a pregnancy termination. Two weeks later she received a 
check for $5,000. She phoned the hospital to ask who it was from. The hospital said, 
‘Crimestoppers.’”  
 A June 2011 email described a man seeking to obtain “welfare” for his dogs because 
they are “mixed in color, unemployed, lazy, can’t speak English and have no frigging 
clue who their Daddies are.”  
 An October 2011 email included a photo of a bare-chested group of dancing 
women, apparently in Africa, with the caption, “Michelle Obama’s High School 
Reunion.”  
 A December 2011 email included jokes that are based on offensive stereotypes 
about Muslims.  
DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, at 72 (footnotes omitted). Of course, I have only cited 
a small portion of the type of bias that implicit bias training for judges and court personnel 
should address. There is no reason to believe these incidents are limited to Ferguson. Indeed, 
over the past two years we have seen, on the news and in social media, example after example, 
of similar emails from police departments and court personnel throughout the nation. 
 102. NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 14–15. 
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5) That the Supreme Court require training of all court 
personnel in the constitutional rights of the people who use the 
courts and education on the fundamental purposes of the courts 
and create a mechanism for monitoring.
103
  
6) That the Supreme Court require municipal judges to have 
and use uniform bench cards. The “Draft Bench Card for 
Missouri Municipal Courts: Collection of Fines and Costs, 
Ability to Pay, and Alternatives to Fines and Costs,” submitted 
by a witness at the public hearing in St. Louis on November 
12, 2015, is a template the Court might adopt. Another 
template are the bench cards promulgated by the Ohio 
Supreme Court for municipal courts.
104
  
7) That the Supreme Court require substantial and increased 
guidance and oversight by the presiding circuit judges of the 
municipal courts, as required by statute and court rule, to 
assure that the presiding circuit judges adequately monitor and 
supervise all municipal divisions under their jurisdiction on 
these and all other statutory and rule requirements.  
8) That the Supreme Court require municipal courts to operate 
“open courts” and dignified courtrooms and provide adequate 
notice to defendants and the public of their rights and 
responsibilities. The requirement of “open courts” should be 
construed not only to mandate that the courts are open to the 
public (including children and caretakers), but it should also be 
construed to include the elimination of secrecy as to policies 
and practices and to require that the courts be accessible, 
dignified, and suited to adequately and fairly handle the 
matters brought forth. This should require mandating that these 
part-time municipal courts be open at least twice a week and 
limiting the number of matters set and/or called for a particular 
 
 103. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, at 72; FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 10 at 33, 89; NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 10–11. 
 104. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUDICIAL SERVICES, COLLECTION OF FINES AND COURT COSTS IN 
ADULT TRAIL COURTS (2015), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/ 
JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf; see also Bret Crow, Bench Card Offers Guidance on Collection of 
Court Fines, Costs, COURT NEWS OHIO (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/ 
happening/2014/benchCards_020414.asp#.VtMatY-cGzc. 
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one court session. In addition, this would also require 
municipal courts to maintain fully functioning websites with 
correct information posted thereon; provide public defenders to 
people who are facing possible incarceration;
105
 implement 
procedures and provide platforms that inform defendants of 
their rights (especially, but not limited to ability to pay 
guidelines), what legal procedures to expect, what the fine is, 
how to pay, where to pay, community service alternatives, and 
a place to call to get answers; and advise people of such 
information at court via on the record statements, pamphlets, 
courtroom postings, and online.
106
  
9) That the Supreme Court should, under its supervisory 
power, define constitutionally acceptable detention standards 
and mandate that all municipal court holding cells meet such 
minimum standards.
107
  
 
 105. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 31.02 provides the law of who is entitled to a court 
appointed attorney: 
(a) In all criminal cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. If any person charged with an offense, the conviction of which 
would probably result in confinement, shall be without counsel upon his first 
appearance before a judge, it shall be the duty of the court to advise him of his right to 
counsel, and of the willingness of the court to appoint counsel to represent him if he is 
unable to employ counsel. Upon a showing of indigency, it shall be the duty of the 
court to appoint counsel to represent him. If after being informed as to his rights, the 
defendant requests to proceed without the benefit of counsel, and the court finds that 
he has intelligently waived his right to have counsel, the court shall have no duty to 
appoint counsel. If at any stage of the proceedings it appears to the court in which the 
matter is then pending that because of the gravity of the offense charged and other 
circumstances affecting the defendant, the failure to appoint counsel may result in 
injustice to the defendant, the court shall then appoint counsel. Appointed counsel 
shall be allowed a reasonable time in which to prepare the defense. 
This language is sufficient to cover the appointment of counsel to defendants in municipal 
courts who are at risk of confinement. If this is not true, the Court can simply amend the 
language of the Rule to include persons charged with an offense, the conviction of which may 
result in confinement. 
 106. See also FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 8, 82–83; see also NCSC 
MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 17–23.  
 107. The Ferguson Commission also recommended that: 
Municipal courts shall provide all inmates held in any municipal jail with a toothbrush, 
toothpaste, hand soap, shower access, reasonably sanitary surroundings, exercise, 
reading materials, adequate medical care, and nutritious meals. Feminine hygiene 
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10) That the Supreme Court require presiding circuit judges to 
monitor all municipal divisions within their circuit on each of 
these important issues.  
B) Consolidation of municipal divisions, including any 
authority of the Supreme Court to mandate consolidation: 
The Final Report provides, after reviewing the various sections of 
Article V of the Constitution and “reading them in light of the 
overarching principle of separation of powers as declared in Article 
II, § 1, it is not plausible to conclude that the Supreme Court 
possesses the constitutional authority to order consolidation of the 
municipal divisions.” I disagree.  
The Constitution does not specifically state that the Court can 
mandate consolidation. It similarly does not state that the Court 
cannot mandate consolidation. This is a matter of interpretation. I 
trust the Court would not have asked us to spend precious time 
thinking about this issue if it had the answer. I believe the plain 
meaning of the words supervise and superintending encompass the 
ability of the supervisor to condense and make more efficient, i.e., to 
consolidate.  
 
products shall be provided to inmates upon request. No person shall be charged any 
money for anytime spent in jail or for the provision of basic needs while in jail. 
FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10. This issue has also been raised as a 
constitutional violation in federal court. Specifically, in Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 
3d 1016, 1036 (E.D. Mo. 2015), plaintiffs alleged: 
They were forced to sleep on the floor in overcrowded cells smeared with feces, blood, 
and mucus; denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, and feminine hygiene products; kept 
in the same clothes for days without access to a shower, laundry, or clean 
undergarments; kept in cold temperatures and forced to share thin blankets; routinely 
denied medical care and prescription medication; provided only honeybuns and 
potpies to eat; provided only a single source of water connected to the top of the toilet, 
which produced warm water with an “unpalatable stench”; and deprived of books, 
legal materials, exercise, television, internet, and natural light. 
The trial court found these allegations “sufficient to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim 
against the City.” Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF, 2015 WL 4232917, at *4 
(E.D. Mo. July 13, 2015). The parts of the complaint relating to the cruel and unusual 
allegations survived the motion to dismiss, while other matters were dismissed. Id. Under the 
Court’s supervisory powers, it can set minimum constitutional standards for courts and holding 
cells. 
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The two provisions of the Missouri Constitution that are decisive 
on the issue are as follows.  
Article V, § 4 of the Missouri Constitution states: 
The Supreme Court shall have general superintending control 
over all courts and tribunals. Each district of the court of 
appeals shall have general superintending control over all 
courts and tribunals in its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court and 
districts of the court of appeals may issue and determine 
original remedial writs. Supervisory authority over all courts 
is vested in the Supreme Court which may make appropriate 
delegations of this power. 
Article V, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
The Supreme Court may establish rules relating to practice, 
procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative 
tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law. The 
rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to 
evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right of 
trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The court shall publish the 
rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule 
shall take effect before six months after its publication. Any 
rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law 
limited to the purpose. 
There is no separation of powers issue. I am not proposing that the 
Supreme Court abolish municipal courts. I am suggesting that, like 
any other “supervisor” or “superintendent,” the Court require 
consolidation of courtrooms, court services, court judges, court staff, 
and court records to make them more efficient and more just. 
Consolidation does not mean abolition. The Court can clearly 
implement rules that govern how the courts operate, where, how 
often, and under what procedural rules. Many other lawyers and 
commentators have similarly concluded.
108
  
 
 108. See, e.g., NCSC MO MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 60, at 9–10; FERGUSON 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 33; POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, 
OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES AND CREATING A REGIONAL APPROACH TO POLICING IN ST. 
LOUIS CITY AND COUNTY 10–14 (2015), available at http://www.policeforum.org/ 
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Moreover, not all municipal courts would even be eligible for 
consolidation. By exercising its supervisory power, the Supreme 
Court could decide which districts would be eligible. So, for 
example, the Supreme Court could assert that the maximum number 
of municipal divisions in any circuit that can effectively be 
administered by one presiding circuit judge is 10, 15, 20, or 25 
divisions. As noted earlier, in the 21st Judicial Circuit, there are 81 
municipal courts; some are a square mile or less. Many, if not most, 
depend on revenue generated from the courts to fund their municipal 
operations.
109
 The aggregate cost of these municipal courts totals 
nearly 16 million dollars.
110
 And, despite this exorbitant amount, they 
cannot even afford to operate the courts more than once or twice a 
month and usually not even for a full day! Moreover, many of these 
judges (some of whom are not even lawyers) are disposing of literally 
hundreds and sometimes over a thousand cases in a single half-day 
session. This is absolutely outrageous. One cannot even pretend that 
justice is being served under such circumstances. The municipal 
courts in this circuit would be a prime candidate for consolidation of 
courtrooms, court services, court staff, court recordkeeping, and court 
judges.
111
  
I recommend that the Court exercise its constitutional supervisory 
power over all courts and consolidate the municipal courts in the 21st 
Judicial Circuit. This can be accomplished in several ways:  
1) The Supreme Court institute a consolidated regional court 
system for the 21st Judicial Circuit, where all of the 
 
assets/stlouis.pdf (recommending three police districts in St. Louis County); Editorial, For Real 
Court Reform, Look to Jennings, not Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2015), 
available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-for-real-
court-reform-look-to-jennings-not-ferguson/article_3644e988-5892-5af3-8aa8-86d1fed7e047. 
html; ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 73, at 5; St. Louis Transcript of the Public Hearing. 
 109. Circuit Courts of Missouri, JUD. BRANCH OF ST. GOV’T, https://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
page.jsp?id=321 (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). 
 110. BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 74, app. 27 tbl.6. The total 
aggregate of St. Louis County Courts comes to $15,843,552. Id. app. 29 tbl.6. This number 
underrepresents the total cost because ten municipalities did not report court costs. Id. app. 27–
29 tbl.6.  
 111. Tony Messenger, Missouri Supreme Court Faces Its Reputation-Defining Moment, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/tony-
messenger/messenger-missouri-supreme-court-faces-its-reputation-defining-moment/article_ 
0a26f1a9-f1d7-505b-90d2-0aff4c642644.html. 
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municipalities within the circuit share three or four full-time 
professional courts, geographically dispersed throughout St. 
Louis County, with three or four full-time judges, and the 
necessary full-time staff. The total cost of such a regional court 
system would amount to between $6,000,000 and $8,000,000. 
See attached Exhibit 4 from Better Together which provides 
the layout, operation and costs of this consolidated and more 
efficient system.
112
  
2) Another alternative is for the Missouri Supreme Court to 
create a rule requiring that municipal judges in a first class 
county of over 900,000 “shall” be associate circuit judges. This 
will effectively reduce the number of municipal court judges, 
eliminate part-time judges, subject these new associate circuit 
judges to the same rules that other judges in the state have to 
abide by (full time; no practice of law), and allow more 
effective control and supervision over the courts by the 
presiding circuit judges. The work of the part-time judges in 
incorporated (and unincorporated) St. Louis County could be 
accomplished by three or four full-time associate circuit 
judges, at a cost far, far, far below the total aggregate costs of 
the 81 in the incorporated areas and the few in the 
unincorporated area of St. Louis County. If desired, these full-
time associate circuit judges could “ride circuit,” among the 
municipalities that have appropriate and adequate facilities and 
staff, as is true for many of the 168 associate circuit judges 
who currently service municipal courts across the state. 
3) A third alternative is for the Missouri Supreme Court to 
narrow the jurisdiction of the municipal courts and assign 
classes of case matters to a particular (set) of courts 
 
 112. See infra Exhibit 4. This document was prepared by Better Together and contains an 
example of how this can be done: 4 satellite courts with 3–4 courtrooms, operating full time, 5 
days a week, at a fraction of the cost of the current fragmented system in the incorporated areas 
of St. Louis County, along the lines of what is currently in place for the unincorporated area of 
St. Louis County. Additionally, in April of 2015, a team of Washington University MBA and 
business students proposed a regional court system at the Olin School of Business’s annual 
Taylor Community Consulting Program. The results are available at www.archcity 
defenders.org. The Court can adopt these models or hire experts to study this matter and 
propose solutions.  
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(determining what courts will adjudicate particular matters 
involves court procedure, not substance); i.e., assign cases 
initiated by a municipal government to be transferred to 
associate court divisions. Mo. Rev. State § 479.040 is not 
inconsistent.
113
 
A) Use of Warrants/process for setting bonds & time of 
incarceration 
“[W]hen we’re talking about warrants, we’re very often talking 
about someone who was simply unable to pay a traffic fine or a 
citation for a code violation and missed a court date. . . . 
Warrants are so prolific that 27 municipalities in St. Louis 
County have accrued more outstanding warrants than they 
have residents.
114
  
In this area, I recommend the following: 
1) That the Supreme Court require municipal prosecutors to 
review open cases and dismiss those founded on failure to 
appear and once dismissed, the warrants be recalled and 
canceled. Indeed, whenever a case is dismissed, and the review 
of cases that should be dismissed must occur regularly (i.e., at 
 
 113. Missouri Revised Statute section 479.040 provides:  
Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the transfer or assignment of another judge to 
hear and determine a case or class of cases when otherwise authorized by provisions of 
the constitution, law, or court rule. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 479.040 (2015). Additionally, Missouri Revised Statute section 478.230, 
provides that cases may be transferred away from the jurisdiction of municipal judges:  
A municipal judge may hear and determine municipal ordinance violation cases of the 
municipality or municipalities making provision for the particular municipal judge. 
The provisions of this section authorizing the hearing and determination of particular 
cases or classes of cases by municipal judges shall be subject to the transfer, 
assignment, and disqualification provisions contained in article V of the 
constitution, in provisions of law, or in court rules which are authorized by the 
constitution or by law. (Emphasis added). 
MO. REV. STAT. § 478.230 (2015).  
 114. Sew Better Together Study Links Fragmentation to Citizen Disengagement, BETTER 
TOGETHER (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/genadmin4_pressrelease?utm_ 
content=buffer8f3a8&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  A Dissenter’s View 159 
 
 
least once a year), the warrants must be recalled and canceled 
accordingly. 
2) That the Supreme Court adopt uniform procedures for 
ability to pay determinations and institute strong incentives for 
municipal court judges to conduct meaningful ability to pay 
hearings. 
3) I incorporate herein by this reference the recommendations 
contained in the Ferguson Commission Report on these 
issues.
115
 
4) That the Supreme Court eliminate arrest warrants and cash 
bonds. Confinement should only be an option for violence or 
public safety related matters, repeated failures to appear and 
failures to pay after meaningful determination that the person 
is not indigent only in case of absolute last resort.
116
 
5) That the Supreme Court require presiding circuit judges to 
monitor all municipal divisions within their circuit on these 
matters.  
B) Enforceability of judgments and remedies for nonpayment: 
1) As per Article IX, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution, 
municipal fines must be deposited into state treasury school 
funds and cannot be retained by municipalities. Article IX, § 7 
of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
All interest accruing from investment of the county school 
fund, the clear proceeds of all penalties, forfeitures and fines 
collected hereafter for any breach of the penal laws of the 
state, the net proceeds from the sale of estrays and all other 
moneys coming into said funds shall be distributed annually to 
the schools of the several counties according to law.  
I believe fines collected by municipal courts are collected for 
breaches of state penal laws. If such fines are penal in nature, then the 
Missouri Supreme Court has already spoken. In Missouri Gaming 
 
 115. See FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 30, 79. 
 116. See id. at 31, 71; DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13 at 99. 
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Comm’n v. Missouri Veteran’s Comm’n, 951 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. banc 
1997), the Court stated:  
[W]here fines and penalties are prescribed as a punishment for 
a violation of public rights, i.e., crimes, and such penalties or 
fines are to be recovered by public authority, the disposition of 
such recovered fines or penalties comes within the 
constitutional provision [article IX, section 7] . . . and they 
may not be turned [sic] away from the prescribed 
constitutional course.
117
 
Double jeopardy attaches for fines levied in municipal courts; 
therefore they are penal laws.
118
 Thus, the statute allowing municipal 
courts to retain said funds is unconstitutional. The municipal courts 
should be ordered to turn over money they receive from fines to the 
school fund. 
Of course, the Constitution does allow municipalities to keep fines 
under certain circumstances. Specifically:  
A municipal corporation with a population of under four 
hundred thousand shall have the right to enforce its ordinances 
and to conduct prosecutions before an associate circuit judge in 
the absence of a municipal judge and in appellate courts under 
the process authorized or provided by this article and shall 
receive and retain any fines to which it may be entitled. All 
court costs shall be paid to and deposited monthly in the state 
treasury. No filing fees shall be charged in such prosecutions 
unless and until provided for by a law enacted after the 
adoption of this article.
119
  
None of those circumstances apply here. Thus, I recommend that the 
Supreme Court order municipalities to turn over all such fines to the 
school fund. 
 
 117. Mo. Gaming Comm’n v. Mo. Veterans’ Comm’n, 951 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1997) 
(quoting State ex rel. Rodes v. Warner, 94 S.W. 962, 966 (Mo. 1906)). 
 118. Weaver v. Schaaf, 520 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1975); see also Kansas City v. Bott, 509 
S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. 1974); State v. Clark, 263 S.W.3d 666, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 119. MO. CONST. art. V, § 27(16) (2015) (emphasis added). 
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1) If the Missouri Supreme Court believes that the fines are 
constitutional, then: 
a. Debts in municipal courts should be converted to civil debts 
and paid via civil debt collection mechanisms (tax refund 
intercepts; garnishments, etc.).
120
  
b. The Supreme Court put procedures in place that will require 
municipal courts to consider community service and other 
alternative payment vehicles.
121
  
c. That the Supreme Court consider doing everything and 
anything in its power to repair community relations, rebuild 
public trust, and restore integrity in the courts as centers of 
justice rather than revenue collection centers. The Court might 
consider the creation of community justice centers as 
recommended by the Ferguson Commission, incorporated 
herein by this reference
122
 
d. The Supreme Court eliminate the suspension of drivers’ 
licenses for minor traffic offenses. A driver’s license is not a 
privilege for most adults in this state. It is virtually a required 
(and for most adults the only) means of transportation. We are 
kidding ourselves if we think we live in a place with anything 
close to adequate public transportation.
123
 The pictures in 
Exhibit 5 are of bus stops on Lindbergh Blvd near the Dorsett 
exit. I took these pictures between February 18 and 24 of 2016. 
You are looking at bus stops on what is, in effect, a highway. It 
is a potential death trap. There are no sidewalks. People 
literally have to walk through hills, grass, and mud in rain, 
snow and ice in winter, climb over rails, to then stand on a 
highway, uncovered as they wait for a bus. God forbid one has 
 
 120. FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 31. 
 121. Id. at 31, 86; BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5, 15; DOJ 
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 13, at 99.  
 122. Compare FERGUSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 32, with Karen Tokarz 
& Sam Stragand, Community Justice Courts Can Be an Innovative Reform, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 5, 2016), http://m.stltoday.com/news/opinion/community-justice-courts-can-
be-an-innovative-reform/article_96a59f74-f1cd-5aff-802e-014955831e69.html?mobile_touch= 
true. 
 123. See infra Exhibit 5. 
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a disability; or multiple packages to carry or children to 
manage. Immediate relief must be provided for people to 
obtain hardship licenses to get to work, pick up children, 
cash/deposit checks. And yes, this practice affects Blacks and 
the poor in our state at disproportionate rates. The practice 
should be prohibited.
124
 There are mechanisms in place under 
Missouri law for a person to apply for and obtain a hardship 
license. That process can take at least 20 days. That is about 19 
days after the person may have already lost their job. The 
Court needs to assure a more immediate option.  
e. The Supreme Court require presiding circuit judges to 
monitor all municipal divisions within their circuit on these 
matters. 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION: 
In addition to the Recommendations of the Working Group for the 
Court, I would also ask the Court to consider the following 
recommendations to the Legislature: 
a) Consolidate the municipal courts in the 21st Judicial Circuit 
(or require municipal judges in St. Louis County to be 
associate circuit judges), if the Supreme Court does not believe 
it has the power to do so;  
b) Institute one cap on revenue retention for all of Missouri 
municipalities (not 12.5% in some places and 20% in St. Louis 
County); and 
c) Apply the cap apply to all municipal code violations not 
just minor traffic violations.
125
   
 
 124. See Not Just Ferguson—How Traffic Courts Drive Inequality in California, LAW. 
COMMITTEE FOR C.R. OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, http://www.lccr.com/not-just-ferguson-
problem-how-traffic-courts-drive-inequality-in-california/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). See also 
Lee Romney, Driver’s License Suspensions Push Poor Deeper into Poverty, Report Says, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-license-
suspensions-20150408-story.html. 
 125. I understand that this has been proposed in recent legislation.  
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EXHIBIT 1 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
May 14, 2015 
In re: Supreme Court Municipal Division Work Group 
O R D E R 
 
There is hereby established a "Supreme Court Municipal Division Work Group."  
The work group will assist the Court by reviewing all matters relevant to practice in the 
municipal divisions of the circuit court and making recommendations concerning any 
appropriate changes to court rules or practices that can be implemented by the Court as 
well as any suggestions that may require legislation or action by other entities.   
The work group will review the applicable constitutional provisions; statutes; 
ethical, procedural and operating court rules; recently passed legislation; and such other 
materials as the work group believes would be helpful to its study.   
The Court also will furnish the work group with reports from the United States 
Department of Justice, the current judge assigned to the Ferguson municipal division and 
the office of state courts administrator, all comments received pursuant to the Court's 
invitation to make comments on municipal divisions, as well as other reports and 
suggestions received by the Court.   
The work group also is requested to hold one or more public hearings and to 
consult with interested parties. 
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 2 
The work group shall be composed of the following: 
Kathryn P. Banks, St. Louis, Missouri; 
Ann K. Covington, Columbia, Missouri; 
The Honorable  Karl DeMarce, Judge, First Judicial Circuit; 
The Honorable Sly James, Mayor, Kansas City, Missouri; 
Professor Kimberly Norwood, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri; 
Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Jefferson City, Missouri; 
Booker T. Shaw, St. Louis, Missouri; 
Rueben Shelton, St. Louis, Missouri; 
The Honorable Todd Thornhill, Chief Judge, Springfield Municipal 
Division.  
 
Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Ann K. Covington, and Booker T. Shaw are appointed 
chairs of the work group.  
The committee shall file an interim report to this Court on or before September 1, 
2015, and, if possible, a final report on or before December 1, 2015. 
The committee shall meet at such times and places as determined by the chairs, 
and members will be reimbursed actual expenses as authorized for state employees.   
 
Day – to – Day 
 
____________________________ 
       MARY R. RUSSELL 
Chief Justice 
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EXHIBIT 2 
 
MUNICIPALITIES WITH COURTS IN THE 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
STATE OF MISSOURI & THE  
SALARIES PAID TO THEIR MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES & 
PROSECUTORS
126
  
 
MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
Ballwin 30,498 2.46% $1,130 per 
month (13,560 
per year) 
$1,190 per 
court session 
2 
Bella Villa 726 1.51% $500 per month 
(6,000 per year) 
$780 per 
month (9,360 
per year) 
1 
Bellefontaine 13,193 72.67% $500 per session $850 per 
session 
2 
Bellerive 189 43.09% No data provided $300 per 
session 
1 
Bel-Nor 1,490 46.43% No data provided No data 
provided 
1 
Bel-Ridge 2,726 83.12% $1,550 per 
month (18,600 
per year) 
$1,550 per 
month 
(18,600 per 
year) 
3 
Berkeley 9,099 81.82% $36,000 per year $70,000 per 
year 
2 
Beverly Hills 570 92.68% No data provided No data 
provided 
1 
Black Jack 6,933 81.21% $375 per session $400 per 
session 
2 
 
 126. Not all municipalities responded to my Sunshine request for salary information and in 
a majority of cases it took a great deal of effort to obtain responses. There is another article that 
must be written dealing with the public’s right to documents under established laws and how 
the public can obtain compliance without obstreperousness at every level imaginable. This chart 
is the author’s best attempt to record the information the author was able to collect. All 
submissions are on file with author. 
 127. Does not include fees paid to provisional judges. 
 128. Figures below, with rare exceptions, will not include preparation time, xerox & other 
costs or per hour charges to litigate cases in Circuit Court; with few exceptions, there is also a 
separate salary for the city attorney. In some cases the prosecutor & city attorney are 1 in the 
same. 
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MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
Breckenridge 
Hills 
4,648 32.70% Unexplained 
variance of $700 
per month for 
some months 
and $1,050 per 
month for other 
months 
$325 per 
session 
although city 
attorney also 
indicated that 
the $2014 
records were 
lost in a 
basement 
flood. 
2 
Brentwood 8,032 3.10% $1,250 per 
month ($15,000 
per year) 
$20,000 per 
year 
2 
Bridgeton 11,686 18.72% $24,000 per year $1,000 per 
year 
2 
Calverton Park 1,291 42.23% $663.11 per 
month 
($7,957.32 per 
year) 
$663.11 per 
month 
($7,957.32 
per year) 
2 
Charlack 1,366 35.44% Two judges at 
$750 per month 
($9,000 per year) 
$1,100 per 
month 
($13,200 per 
year) 
2 
Chesterfield 47,749 2.65% $33,750 per year $40,500 per 
year 
$6,000 per 
year (asst.) 
3 
Clarkson Valley 2,645 1.48% $800 per month 
($9,600 per year) 
$750 per 
month 
($9,000 per 
year) 
1 
Clayton 15,884 8.19% $600 per session $29,000 per 
year 
3 
Cool Valley 1,193 84.54% No data provided No data 
provided 
1 
Country Club 
Hills 
2,486 87.13% $12,000 per year $9,600 per 
year 
2 
Crestwood 11,942 1.60% $1,000 per 
month ($12,000 
per year) 
$770 per 
month 
($9,240 per 
year) 
3 
Creve Coeur 17,865 7.17% $20,000 per year $38,000 per 
year 
4 
Dellwood 5,004 79.16% $650 per month 
($7,800 per year) 
$650 per 
month 
($7,800 per 
year) 
1 
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MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
Des Peres 8,466 0.94% $14,400 per year $14,400 per 
year 
1 
Edmundson 837 26.38% $350 per session $800 per 
month 
($9,600 per 
year) 
2 
Ellisville 9,173 1.89% $1,365 per 
month ($16,380 
per year) 
$180 per 
hr/partner 
$150 per 
hr/associate 
$95 per 
hr/paralegal 
1 
Eureka 10,467 0.81% $350 per case 
session 
$90 per hour 2 
Fenton 4,045 0.37% $1,000 per 
month ($12,000 
per year) 
$1,000 per 
month 
($12,000 per 
year) 
1 
Ferguson 21,111 67.43%   3 
Flordell Hills 819 90.75% $550 per month 
($6,600 per year) 
$500 per 
month 
($6,000 per 
year) 
1 
Florissant 52,363 26.76% $55,000 per year $551 per 
court session 
7 
Frontenac 3,518 2.64% $1,000 per 
month ($12,000 
per year) 
$1,500 per 
month 
($18,000 per 
year) 
1 
Glendale 5,921 0.74% $600 per month 
($7,200 per year) 
$600 per 
month 
($7,200 per 
year) 
1 
Grantwood 
Village 
866 0.58% No data provided No data 
provided 
Every 
other 
month 
(6 times 
per year) 
Greendale 654 68.51% $275 per month 
($3,300 per year) 
$450 per 
month 
($5,400 per 
year) 
 
Hanley Hills 2,103 85.29% No data provided No data 
provided 
2 
Hazelwood 25,668 30.48% No data provided No data 
provided 
4 
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MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
Hillsdale 1,518 95.94% $10,400 per year $9,000 per 
year 
2 
Jennings 14,756 89.79% $14,700 per year $11,785.44 
per year 
1 
Kinloch 299 94.63% $500 per session $500 per 
month 
($6,000 per 
year) w/ add’l 
$250 per 
night 
prosecutor 
attends a 
session 
1 
Kirkwood 27,596 7.00% $400 per session $4,250 per 
month 
($51,000 per 
year) 
4 
Ladue 8,560 0.99% $9,000 per year $12,000 per 
year 
1 
Lakeshire 1,427 2.86% No data provided No data 
provided 
 
Manchester 18,186 3.12% $12,000 per 
month ($14,400 
per year) 
$1,300 per 
month 
($15,600 per 
year) 
2 
Maplewood 7,968 17.20% $15,998 per year $21,907 per 
year 
3 
Marlborough 2,188 1.51% $556.50 per 
month ($6,678 
per year) 
$916.60 per 
month 
($10,999.20 
per year) 
1 
Maryland Heights 27,436 11.87% $32,000 per year $537 per 
court docket; 
$658 per trial 
docket; 
$146 per hr 
prep & 
special 
appearances 
4 
Moline Acres 2,439 92.10% $13,200 per year $13,800 per 
year 
2 
Normandy 4,987 69.75% $1,800 per 
month ($21,600 
per year) 
$1,500 per 
month 
($18,000 per 
year) 
2 
Northwoods 4,207 93.94% No data provided No data 
provided 
2 
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MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
Oakland 1,381 2.17% $3,700 per year $10,000 per 
year 
1 
Olivette 7,823 23.89% $800 per month 
($9,600 per year) 
$850 per 
month 
($10,200 
year) 
2 
Overland 16,008 16.36% $21,600 per year $16,500 per 
year 
3 
Pacific 7,077 8.43% $6,755 per year $110 per hour  
Pagedale 3,307 93.43% $400 per session $400 per 
session 
2 
Pine Lawn 3,425 96.40% $1,900 per 
month 
$1,200 per 
month 
2 
Richmond 
Heights 
8,508 11.65% $25,000 per year $30,000 per 
year 
2 
Riverview 2,840 69.89% No data provided No data 
provided 
1 
Rock Hill 4,639 22.96% $11,740 per year $11,740 per 
year 
2 
Shrewsbury 6,219 3.61% $15,510 per year $18,912 per 
year 
2 
St. Ann 12,971 22.11% $2,000 per 
month ($24,000 
per year) 
$1,500 per 
month 
($18,000 per 
year) 
4 
St. John 6,486 24.29% $1,807 per 
month ($21,684 
per year) 
$1,700 per 
month 
($20,400 per 
year) 
2 
Sunset Hills 8,522 1.51% $1,200 per 
month ($14,400 
per year) 
$1,200 per 
month 
($14,400 per 
year) 
3 
Sycamore Hills 664 12.28% No courts; 
contracts w/ City 
of St. John at 
$4,068.88 per 
month for all 
court services 
($48,826.56 per 
year) 
N/A N/A 
Town & Country 10,922 2.59% $1,500 per 
month ($18,000 
per year) 
$3,000 per 
month 
($36,000 per 
year) 
2 
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MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH COURTS 
POPULATION 
 (2013) 
PERCENTAGE 
BLACK 
JUDGE 
SALARY127 
PROSECUTOR 
SALARY128 
TIMES 
COURT 
MEETS/ 
MONTH 
University City 35,148 41.09% $500 per session 
($17,500 per 
year) 
$30,000 per 
year 
2 
Uplands Park 447 96.40% $375 per quarter  Services 
volunteered 
1 
Valley Park 6,986 3.96% $8,400 per year $9,600 per 
year 
1 
Velda City 1,410 95.42% No data provided No data 
provided 
3 
Velda Village 
Hills
†
 
1,052 98.48% $5,500 per year $11,873.51 
per year 
1 
Vinita Park 1,881 64.89% $1,100 per 
month ($13,200 
per year) 
$600 per 
session 
2 
Vinita Terrace 278 72.92% $500 per month 
($6,000 per year) 
$500 per 
month 
($6,000 per 
year) 
1 
Warson Woods 1,955 0.46% $250 per month 
($3,000 per year) 
$200 per 
month 
($2,400 per 
year) 
1 
Webster Groves 23,203 6.62% $1,384 per 
month ($16,608 
per year 
($692 biweekly) 
$3,000 per 
month 
($36,000 per 
year) 
2 
Wellston 2,331 95.42% $1,000 per 
month ($12,000 
per year) 
$1,200 per 
month 
($14,400 per 
year) 
3 
Wildwood 35,787 1.66% $1,500 per 
month ($18,000 
per year) 
$1,600 per 
month 
($19,200 per 
year) 
2 
Winchester 1,546 1.23% $607 per month 
($7,284 per year) 
$1,734 per 
month 
($20,808 per 
year) 
1 
Woodson Terrace 4,065 20.77% $18,520 per year $17,656 per 
year 
1 
 
† Velda Village Hills submitted Form 1099s for 2014 and 2015. These figures are from the 
2014 Form 1099s. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITHIN 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURTS  
(INCORPORATED AREAS)
129
 
 
In order to illustrate the potential for conflicts in the St. Louis 
County Municipal Court system, see the following February calendar 
for just one law firm, the Clayton, Missouri law firm of Curtis, Heinz, 
Garrett, and O’Keefe, which provides multiple judges, city attorneys, 
and prosecutors for multiple municipalities in the incorporated areas 
of St. Louis County. City council meetings reflect meetings that the 
firm would attend as city attorney for that municipality. Also 
reflected are municipal court sessions where the firm serves as judge 
or prosecutor. What this calendar demonstrates is the impossibility, 
under the current system, of this firm avoiding conflicts of interest. 
 
Monday, Feb. 1, 2016 
 7 pm   Brentwood—City Council Meeting 
7:30 pm   Hazelwood—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Richmond Heights—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  St. Ann—City Council Meeting 
 
Tuesday, Feb. 2, 2016 
 6 pm   Bel-Ridge—City Council Meeting 
 6:30 pm  Hazelwood—Municipal Court 
 6:30 pm  Webster Groves—City Council Meeting 
 6:30 pm  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Charlack—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Creve Coeur—City Council Meeting 
  
 
 129. E-mail from David Leipholtz, Dir. of Community Based Studies, Better Together, 
to Kimberly Norwood, Professor Washington University School of Law (Feb. 24, 2016, 9:02 
AM) (on file with author).  
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Wednesday, Feb. 3, 2016 
 5 pm   Velda City—Municipal Court 
 6 pm   Bel-Nor—Municipal Court 
 6 pm   Normandy—Municipal Court 
 
Thursday, Feb. 4, 2016 
 7 pm   Normandy—City Council 
 7 pm   Sunset Hills—Municipal Court 
  7:30 pm  Bellefontaine Neighbors—City Council 
       Meeting 
 
Friday, Feb. 5, 2016 
 12 pm   St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 
Monday, Feb. 8, 2016 
 6 pm   Oakland—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Ballwin—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Des Peres—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Lakeshire—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Oakland—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Town & Country—City Council Meeting 
 
Tuesday, Feb. 9, 2016 
 6:30 pm  Hazelwood—Municipal Court 
6:30 pm  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Clayton—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Edmundson—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Sunset Hills—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Northwoods—City Council Meeting 
 
Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2016 
 9 am   Ferguson—Municipal Court 
9 am   Velda City—Municipal Court 
 5:30 pm   Webster Groves—Municipal Court 
 6 pm   Ladue—Municipal Court 
 6:30 pm  Country Club Hills—City Council Meeting 
 6:30 pm  St. John—Municipal Court 
 7:30 pm  Velda City—City Council Meeting 
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Thursday, Feb. 11, 2016 
12 pm   St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Sunset Hills—Municipal Court 
 
Monday, Feb. 15, 2016 
 6 pm   Ferguson—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Brentwood—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Bel-Nor—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Hazelwood—City Council 
 7:30 pm  Richmond Heights—City Council Meeting 
 
Tuesday, Feb. 16, 2016 
 9 am   Ferguson—Municipal Court 
 6:30 pm  Hazelwood—Municipal Court 
 6:30 pm  Webster Groves—City Council Meeting 
6:30 pm  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Frontenac—City Council Meeting 
 
Wednesday, Feb. 17, 2016 
 5:30 pm  Frontenac—Municipal Court 
 6 pm   Normandy—Municipal Court 
 
Thursday, Feb. 18, 2016 
 6:30 pm  Lakeshire—Municipal Court 
6:30 pm  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Normandy—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Sunset Hills—Municipal Court 
 7:30 pm  Bellefontaine Neighbors—City Council  
      Meeting 
 
Monday, Feb. 22, 2016 
 6 pm   Ferguson—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Ballwin—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Calverton Park—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Creve Coeur—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Des Peres—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Town & Country—City Council Meeting 
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 7:30 pm  Bellerive Acres—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Richmond Heights—City Council Meeting 
 
Tuesday, Feb. 23, 2016 
 9 am   Ferguson—Municipal Court 
 6:30 pm  Hazelwood—Municipal Court 
6:30 pm  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
 7 pm   Clayton—City Council Meeting 
 7 pm   Ferguson—City Council Meeting 
 7:30 pm  Northwood—City Council Meeting 
 
Wednesday, Feb. 24, 2016 
 5 pm   Velda City—Municipal Court 
 6 pm   Webster Groves—Municipal Court 
6:30 pm  St. John—Municipal Court 
 7:30 pm  Cool Valley—City Council Meeting 
 
Saturday, Feb. 27, 2016 
 8:30 am  St. Ann—Municipal Court 
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EXHIBIT 4 
 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURTS 
DRAFT PLAN FOR CONSOLIDATION
130
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For over a year, numerous studies and reports have shed light on 
the dysfunction present throughout the municipal courts in St. Louis 
County. Conflicts of interests among attorneys acting in the capacity 
of judge, prosecutor, and private attorneys within this system are 
abundant, as are numerous reports of lines wrapped around court 
houses that attempt to clear hundreds of cases in one evening. While 
the passage of Senate Bill 5 provides important reforms to the current 
system, such critical reforms require meaningful oversight to ensure 
proper implementation—an impossibility in the current system of 81 
courts. 
 
Over the course of time, municipal courts in St. Louis County 
have come to be viewed by many as flawed if not completely 
illegitimate. The establishment of a system of fulltime, professional 
courts is an important step in reestablishing the faith of the citizens 
the courts are meant to serve. Doing so requires a visible shift in 
structure and function. What follows is a condensed overview of 
reforms that can achieve that necessary shift through professional, 
fulltime staff, improved facilities, and a new focus on restoring the 
faith of the citizenry in municipal courts throughout St. Louis 
County.  
 
 130. Id. 
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ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
Oversight 
 
Missouri’s framework for municipal-court oversight provides 
administrative power to a presiding judge in each of the forty-five 
circuit courts of Missouri. While this mechanism for oversight 
appears sound, in a highly fragmented region such as St. Louis 
County, it becomes completely untenable due to the sheer number of 
courts. To put this in perspective: A judicial circuit in Missouri 
contains 8.6 municipal court divisions on average. St. Louis County’s 
circuit contains 81 municipal court divisions. So, the presiding judge 
of St. Louis County’s circuit courts must oversee nearly ten times the 
number of courts and judges as an average presiding judge in 
Missouri. This flaw in the oversight structure manifested itself in a 
number of problems. These problems did not manifest themselves for 
a lack of competence at the circuit level, but rather stemmed from a 
flawed structure of oversight. While numerous reforms have been 
made to the courts both within and at the legislative level, the flawed 
structure that enabled these issues remains in place and with it a 
likelihood that issues, new and old, will emerge. 
 
POTENTIAL TO TURN A WEAKNESS INTO A STRENGTH 
 
The municipal court system in St. Louis County has come to serve 
as a symbol of division and mistrust in many communities. By 
consolidating the courts, proper supervision will finally be possible. 
It will also provide over $8 million in savings and with that savings 
the opportunity to improve and modernize the current system. Just as 
importantly the focus of the system could shift from generating 
revenue to serving as a point of intervention as in King County 
Washington,
131
 which embodies specialized “problem solving 
courts,” as well as technological improvements.  
Often, an appearance in court can reflect a larger issue that must 
be addressed to prevent further violations. King County employs 
 
 131. Information About King County District Court, KING COUNTY (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/district-court/about.aspx. 
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specialty veteran’s courts, mental health courts, and domestic 
violence courts with this in mind. These specialty courts permit 
intervention in complex cases involving some of the most vulnerable 
members of the population. Through the consolidation and reform of 
municipal courts in St. Louis County, an extensive system of 
specialty courts could be established with the goal of addressing 
certain cases at their root and preventing a cycle of noncompliance 
and debt. 
Additionally, a mere fraction of the savings from the new 
consolidated system would allow for technological improvements 
similar to those in King County: automated payment, online 
mitigation, rescheduling of a court date and location, online court 
information, and e-forms. Currently, throughout the St. Louis County 
Circuit, there are entire municipalities that do not have a website let 
alone municipal court sites with information or automation. In fact, 
the system is so archaic in some municipalities that reporters and 
defendants have shown up to court only to find it had been 
cancelled.
132
  
 
Budget and Savings 
 
Better Together’s 2014 report on municipal courts found that 
municipal courts in St. Louis County operated at a cost of 
$13,616,552.
133
 Consolidating the courts into 4 divisions, with 4 full-
time courtrooms staffed by full-time judges, prosecutors, and public 
defenders in each division along with 2 social workers and support 
staff in each division would operate at less than half the current cost. 
What follows is a breakdown of the staff and salaries in a 
consolidated system. 
 
 132. Small Town Sued by Mo. Attorney General No-Shows for Traffic Court, CBS RADIO 
INC. (Dec. 19, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2014/12/19/small-town-sued-by-
mo-attorney-general-no-shows-for-traffic-court/. 
 133. In the BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 74, the $15,843.552 figure 
includes the operating cost for the City of St. Louis at $2,227,000. Once this amount is 
subtracted, the cost for the operation of the St. Louis county municipal courts of $13,616.552 
remains. See E-mail from Dave Leipholtz, Dir. of Community Based Studies, Better Together, 
to Kimberly Norwood, Professor at Washington University School of Law (Apr. 25, 2016, 
10:30 AM) (on file with author). 
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DIVISION STAFFING 
Position Salary # of 
Positions Per 
Division 
Total Salary 
Judge $80,000 4 $320,000 
Prosecutor $50,000 4 $200,000 
Public 
Defender 
$50,000 4 $200,000 
Bailiff $40,000 4 $160,000 
Clerk  $45,000 4 $180,000 
Social Worker $50,000 2 $100,000 
Social Work 
Admin. 
$40,000 1 $40,000 
    
TOTAL 
COST PER 
DIVISION 
  $1,200,000 
 
Two positions likely standout in the above table: public defender 
and social worker. Those positions serve two purposes. First, the 
public defender will give citizens an advocate and someone who at 
the very least can explain their options. While for some, municipal 
court fines are an inconvenience, for others they can lead to a life 
altering financial spiral. A public defender will serve as a much 
needed safeguard in a system that has lost the faith of many citizens. 
Social workers can implement public service options in lieu of fines, 
and more importantly, work with individuals whose lack of 
compliance is a symptom of a much larger issue. These positions 
cannot be dismissed as unnecessary. In St. Louis County 21 
municipalities received 20% or more of their general revenue from 
fines and fees. The populations of those municipalities were on 
average 62% African-American and 22% below the poverty line. 
That is more than double the percentages for St. Louis County as a 
whole. The current system disproportionately impacts poor, black 
communities. Consolidation shifts the focus from extracting revenue 
from citizens to bringing them into compliance and getting them back 
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on their feet, an initial benefit for them and a long-term benefit for 
the region. 
With a total of four divisions, the consolidated system would 
operate at $4.8 million of salaries and benefits with a facility 
operation cost of $815,000 for a total cost of $5,615,000 annually, an 
annual savings of $8,001,552. The result of this consolidated system 
would be the return to a focus on justice and compliance, as well as 
an overall financial savings for citizens across the region. 
 
Caseload 
 
Under the current part-time municipal court system many 
municipalities have court once or twice a month and force over 400 
cases into one evening session. This leads to lines wrapped outside of 
facilities and an experience that further disenfranchises citizens. 
What follows is the current schedule and average caseload in 
municipalities across St. Louis County.
134
 
 
MUNICIPAL 
COURT 
NUMBER OF 
SESSIONS PER 
MONTH 
TOTAL CASES 
FILED 
AVERAGE 
NUMBER OF CASES 
PER DOCKET 
BALLWIN 2 9,006 375 
BELLA VILLA 1 7,053 588 
BELLEFONTAINE 
NEIGHBORS 2 7,981 333 
BEL-NOR 1 1,613 134 
BEL-RIDGE   7,937   
BERKELEY 2 11,767 490 
BEVERLY HILLS 1 4,343 362 
BLACK JACK 2 1,063 44 
BRECKENRIDGE 
HILLS 2 6,468 270 
BRENTWOOD 2 7,161 298 
BRIDGETON 2 4,423 184 
CALVERTON PARK 2 7,493 312 
 
 134. BETTER TOGETHER MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 74, app. 33-34 tbl.8. 
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MUNICIPAL 
COURT 
NUMBER OF 
SESSIONS PER 
MONTH 
TOTAL CASES 
FILED 
AVERAGE 
NUMBER OF CASES 
PER DOCKET 
CHARLACK 2 3,751 156 
CHESTERFIELD 3 13,866 385 
CLARKSON 
VALLEY 1 1,500 125 
CLAYTON 2 7,884 329 
COOL VALLEY 1 9,276 773 
COUNTRY CLUB 
HILLS 2 9,113 380 
CRESTWOOD 3 2,297 64 
CREVE COEUR 4 20,003 417 
DELLWOOD 1 4,127 344 
DES PERES 1 4,171 348 
EDMUNDSON 2 5,888 245 
ELLISVILLE 1 6,866 572 
EUREKA 2 1,192 50 
FENTON 1 4,997 416 
FERGUSON 3 23,794 661 
FLORDELL HILLS 1 3,474 290 
FLORISSANT       
FRONTENAC 1 4,225 352 
GLENDALE 1 1,682 140 
HANLEY HILLS 2 1,340 56 
HAZELWOOD 4 17,597 367 
HILLSDALE 2 3,750 156 
JENNINGS 1 6,745 562 
KINLOCH 1 109 9 
KIRKWOOD 4 4,503 94 
LADUE 1 3,589 299 
MANCHESTER 2 4,779 199 
MAPLEWOOD 3 11,915 331 
MARLBOROUGH 1 920 77 
MARYLAND 
HEIGHTS 4 16,809 350 
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MUNICIPAL 
COURT 
NUMBER OF 
SESSIONS PER 
MONTH 
TOTAL CASES 
FILED 
AVERAGE 
NUMBER OF CASES 
PER DOCKET 
MOLINE ACRES 2 694 29 
NORMANDY 2 10,401 433 
NORTHWOODS 2 5,990 250 
OAKLAND 1 583 49 
OLIVETTE 2 3,597 150 
OVERLAND 3 6,528 181 
PAGEDALE 2 5,781 241 
PINE LAWN 2 23,037 960 
RICHMOND 
HEIGHTS 2 8,549 356 
RIVERVIEW 1 2,972 248 
ROCK HILL 2 6,159 257 
SHREWSBURY 2 4,572 191 
SAINT ANN   28,071   
SAINT JOHN 2 13,663 569 
SUNSET HILLS 3 3,609 100 
TOWN & COUNTRY 2 7,941 331 
UNIVERSITY CITY 2 6,200 258 
UPLANDS PARK 1 1,991 166 
VALLEY PARK 1 2,375 198 
VELDA CITY 3 5,509 153 
VELDA VILLAGE 
HILLS 1 564 47 
VINITA PARK 2 3,490 145 
VINITA TERRACE 1 812 68 
WARSON WOODS 1 450 38 
WEBSTER GROVES 2 8,386 349 
WELLSTON 3 5,854 163 
WILDWOOD 2 6,030 251 
WINCHESTER 1 622 52 
WOODSON 
TERRACE 1 2,920 243 
  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 51:121 
 
 
Based on the current municipal caseload in St. Louis County (roughly 
483,000 annually), a consolidated system of 16 full-time courts 
would be able to process roughly ten cases an hour in front of a 
judge, rather than over 100 cases an hour as in some current 
municipal courts, many of which employ clerks to handle the bulk of 
the court duties rather than the judge. 
 
Elimination of Conflicts 
 
In addition to providing cost savings and restoring 
professionalism in many municipal courts, a consolidated system 
with full-time staffs would eliminate the conflicts that plague the 
current system. It is simply impossible for one presiding judge or the 
Supreme Court of Missouri to monitor the thousands of cases that 
flow through municipal courts each night in St. Louis County. 
Implementing a system of full-time judges and prosecutors would 
eliminate the need to monitor for conflicts on a case by case basis and 
instead implement a systemic solution to the issue. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current system, outside of its ability to generate revenue for 
individual municipalities, has no discernible advantages to a 
consolidated system of full-time professional courts. A full-time 
system will result in cost savings, the elimination of conflicts, 
technological modernization, and most importantly, it will serve to 
restore the faith of citizens in the one place they should always trust 
they will find justice—the courts. 
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EXHIBIT 5 
 
 The following shots were taken by the author on Lindbergh 
Boulevard near the Page Avenue and Dorsett Avenue exits. If you are 
ever in this area, it is worth your time to drive by these bus stops. It is 
impossible to imagine what it takes to reach these bus stops, which 
are located—in the most literal sense—on the shoulder of a highway. 
There is no safe way to get to and from the stops, and they are 
extremely dangerous during evening hours, particularly for young 
women.  
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